

CURRENT *History*

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DECEMBER 1964

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CURRENT History

DECEMBER, 1964

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In December seven specialists review the current situation in West Europe. In an overall view of the area analyzing the European surge toward unity, our introductory author says, "... initiatives for increased political unification stem quite naturally from the European Communities, for the Communities ... have made the most significant progress toward the unification of Europe."

Europe Moves Toward Unity

By GORDON L. WEIL

*Director of Research and Studies,
European Community Information Service*

TWO TASKS faced Europe in the wake of World War II: the creation of conditions that would prevent any future world war from beginning in Europe, and the need to reassert itself in a world dominated by two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The means for solving both problems became evident as early as 1946, when Winston Churchill said: "We must build a kind of United States of Europe."¹

Unity in Europe, according to Europe's political leaders, could weld into a single economy the means of production and distribution of traditionally warring neighbors. This unified economy could, in turn, lead to a unified foreign policy. A united Europe, it was claimed, would become the third superpower, decisively tipping the world balance of power in favor of the West.

Nineteen years after the end of the Second World War, Europe has made considerable progress toward its twin objectives. Contrast

Europe in 1964 with Europe in 1937, 19 years after the end of World War I. The fundamental difference within Europe in the later period has been the continual striving for unity among the European states; the greatest difference in the world is that Europe is no longer on center stage.

A wide variety of institutions were proposed as means of promoting European unity. Six European states—Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands—were willing to accept independent, "supranational," control over traditionally national policies. These states joined in the European Communities. Other countries, including the United Kingdom, were unwilling to accept such international obligations and favored more voluntary arrangements such as the European Free Trade Area. Yet in all cases, European states entering into regional organizations agreed that the maintenance of peace in Europe and the enhancement of Europe's role in world politics were the prime objectives.

A balance sheet can be drawn up of the

¹ Speech at Zurich, Switzerland, September 19, 1946.

successes and failures of European policy in the postwar period. How much unity has been achieved? Has unity and the economic strength inherent in it advanced Europe on the path toward peace and political power?

BALANCE SHEET

The focal point of any discussion of postwar Europe must be the European Communities' imaginative and bold initiatives in meeting the problems facing "the Old World."² The Coal and Steel Community, established in 1952, was based on the Schuman Plan, which called for an independent European authority with real, but limited powers over an economically vital part of the national economy. If the coal and steel industries of France and Germany were welded into one, said Robert Schuman and his colleague, Jean Monnet, neither nation would be able to wage war against the other.

The European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.) is an example of functionalism in international organization.³ Functionalism is also called "peace by pieces," since nations cooperate first in a limited area, and then proceed to coordinate their activities in other sectors on the basis of the mutual confidence they have developed. In addition, by working together in a single sector, politicians develop patterns of behavior that can be carried over in solving other problems.

This theory was proven by the European Coal and Steel Community. The coal, steel and iron industries of the six countries were brought under the control of a supranational High Authority. New rules for pricing, a common market among "the Six," harmonized external tariffs, and independent sources of income were all part of the new Community.

² For historical background, see Hans A. Schmitt, "The European Communities," *Current History*, Vol. 45, No. 267 (November, 1963), pp. 257-263, 302.

³ For the theory of functionalism, see David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1946).

⁴ See Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron (eds.), *France Defeats EDC* (New York: Praeger, 1957).

⁵ The process, outlined here, was originally analyzed by Leon N. Lindberg in *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford: Stanford University, 1963).

The most important offshoot of its success was the discussion among the Six about co-operation in other sectors—military and political affairs. Yet the momentum of the European unity drive outstripped the willingness of the states to accept additional supranational institutions, and the plan for a European Defense Community (E.D.C.) was rejected, taking with it the proposal for a European Political Community.⁴

Despite the failure of the E.D.C., the Coal and Steel Community continued to thrive and to call for new initiatives for expansion of unity efforts. The *relance Européenne* came in the economic sphere with the creation in 1958 of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), designed to unify the economies of the member countries as the Coal and Steel Community had unified the industries under its jurisdiction. The E.E.C. was not destined to use the tools of supranationalism in creating a common market. Because of the complexity of the problems it faced and their importance in national politics, the E.E.C. developed a "community" rather than a supranational approach. This did not mean that the E.E.C. Commission, the body responsible for making proposals for common policies and for the proper execution of the Rome Treaty, sought only to find the lowest common denominator of agreement among the Six. A process known as the "upgrading of the common interest" has been used to encourage states to accept the measures considered necessary by the Commission for the creation of the Common Market.⁵

The E.E.C. Commission makes proposals that the Council of Ministers, representing the member states, may accept, modify or reject. The Commission takes an active part in the talks on its proposal, and in many cases, the Council members are willing to compromise their differences by accepting the Commission's proposal. A member state can make a concession to the Commission which it could not make to one of its partners. If difficulties persist, the Commission may propose new elements of Community policy, likely to be acceptable to the objecting state. Thus the Council member will be able to

accept the entire "package" since he will not have to return to his capital empty-handed.

In this way, the basic proposal remains intact, as opposed to the process of seeking the lowest common denominator, in which member states would have deleted those provisions on which they could not agree. The process of upgrading the common interest is necessary, since the E.E.C. Treaty does not invest the Commission with many supranational powers, and practical, because of the often delicate problems of uniting the economies of six independent states.

The E.E.C. has made considerable progress in achieving unity. The most important and obvious of its accomplishments is the creation of a customs union. Internal tariff barriers have been reduced by 60 per cent from their 1957 levels and many non-tariff barriers have been completely abolished. A common external tariff is also being created by adjusting the pre-existing national tariffs to the average of the 1957 national tariffs; 60 per cent of this adjustment has been accomplished. The progress thus far has been a stimulant to increased trade among member states and with non-member countries. During the 1958-1963 period intra-Community trade rose by 131 per cent and imports from non-member countries by 53 per cent. This made the E.E.C. the largest importer in the world, with imports valued at \$24.6 billion. Community exports to non-member countries increased by 36 per cent during the same period.⁶

A second area in which the E.E.C. has been successful in unifying the policies of the Six is agriculture. This sector, above all others, is particularly delicate since efficient production is not the only goal of national governments. The political power and the social and economic role of farmers demand special attention for their problems. Nonetheless, the Community's common agricultural policy is aimed at the stimulation of the most efficient production while providing for necessary adjustment assistance to less efficient producers—all within the realm of political

reality. The framework for the common agricultural policy and all necessary regulations has been established for products representing 85 per cent of Community agricultural production. Thus, there is a common market for farm products providing for a uniform system of supports, import controls, quality standards and other common factors.

The single element still lacking in the development of the common agricultural policy is a price policy. The member states have yet to agree on the common price for grains, a key element in the entire program, which will influence support prices for several other commodities. These price levels will determine the number of farmers who will continue to find farming a profitable occupation.

The Community has, on the other hand, agreed upon a means of financing the agricultural policy. Within the framework of this policy, both support assistance and adjustment assistance must be provided. Adjustment assistance to farmers who no longer find farming profitable and who must be retrained for other jobs will be derived from payments by those countries whose agricultural production is most efficient.

Community policy-makers concluded that a true common market requires the abolition of tax frontiers as well as the creation of a customs union. Turnover taxes of all member states are being harmonized, allowing the Community market to assume the characteristics of a domestic market. Agreement has been reached on a single tax system based upon the value added to a product at each step of its production and levied in the form of a sales tax.

THE ROME TREATY

On certain subjects, the Rome Treaty is explicit. The Treaty provides, in such cases, a time table, a decision-making rule, and even basic guidelines. In other areas, only general references are made to policies upon which the member states must agree. The most important of these are economic and monetary. In 1963, the E.E.C. Commission proposed means of cooperation among member states and their central banks in developing

⁶ The Seventh General Report of the E.E.C. Commission surveys trade trends in greater detail.

a common economic and monetary policy. The inflationary threat of 1964 stimulated the member states to accept many of the Commission's proposals. As a result, central bankers of the member states meet regularly, as do government officials responsible for the development of the national economies. In terms of the "medium-term forecast," member states were willing in 1964 to accept recommendations by the E.E.C. Commission on economic policies which would, in effect, limit their discretion in planning national budgets and other policies traditionally within the power of the state.

The Community's external relations have proven to be among the most successful of its activities. The six member states, acting as a single unit, have completed a second association agreement with 17 African countries and Madagascar. In a five-year period, almost \$800 million of foreign aid will be channeled by the Community to these states. In the period 1958-1963, more than \$500 million in aid was made available by the E.E.C. The Community has concluded agreements of a different kind with Greece and Turkey. These agreements are aimed at the eventual full membership in the E.E.C. of these two states through favorable trade arrangements designed to stimulate their economic growth.

The most important aspect of the Community's "foreign policy" is the "Kennedy Round" of trade negotiations within the framework of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Here the Commission has been given the power to negotiate on behalf of the Community states on such important matters as tariff reductions, agricultural protection, non-tariff barriers and trade assistance to the developing countries. The stimulus for the United States proposal for this round of tariff negotiations was the impact of the E.E.C. on world trade.

The European Community has encountered difficulties in several sectors in developing a unified common market. Among these are

the creation of a common energy policy (which must be reached in agreement with the E.C.S.C. and Euratom), a common transport policy, and a common commercial policy which would include a comprehensive policy toward developing countries. In some of these areas, the Commission has made proposals, but the Council of Ministers has yet to act upon them. In others, the Commission is still seeking an agreement with interested parties and the member states on the nature of the proposals to be made. There are other more specialized sectors where greater harmonization or unification remains to be accomplished, especially in the field of law.

Certain of the difficulties facing the Community may be overcome after January 1, 1966, when the weighted majority system of voting enters into effect.⁷ Under this system, a Commission proposal may be accepted by the Council over the objection of one of the three larger or two of the three smaller member states. Even after January, 1966, however, the Community will probably continue to seek agreement through the pattern already established rather than by weighted voting.

President Walter Hallstein of the E.E.C. Commission has outlined the reasons why integration has made greater progress in some sectors than in others. The first reason is the Rome Treaty itself; on some subjects the Treaty is not well-defined and in these areas progress is slowest. A second factor in determining the pace of E.E.C. development is the self-interest of the member states. The ultimate Community decision takes into account national interests, but it is often reached after lengthy and vigorous debate. There are, of course, areas in which national self-interest coincides with Community interest; this was the case with the recent adoption of anti-inflationary measures. A third factor slowing the pace of integration, according to President Hallstein, is the limited personnel available to the Commission.⁸

The third of the European Communities, Euratom, was conceived in the hope that atomic power would replace traditional sources of energy supply endangered during the Suez crisis of 1956. Subsequent develop-

⁷ E.E.C. Treaty, Arts. 8 and 148.

⁸ Address by President Hallstein to European Parliament on June 18, 1964.

ments, such as the natural gas found in the Netherlands and Sahara oil, have reduced the immediate necessity for power derived from nuclear sources. Nevertheless, Euratom has been given the responsibility for developing nuclear energy as part of the energy policy of the Community. Currently, Euratom's research program is being actively debated by the member states and the Euratom Commission to determine how Euratom can most effectively coordinate its policies with those already existing in the six member countries.

OTHER EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS

The European Communities form part of a panoply of European organizations. Among the others the most important, in the economic sphere, is the European Free Trade Association (E.F.T.A.), the Outer Seven.⁹ E.F.T.A. seeks to establish a free trade area through the abolition of tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade among the seven countries, while permitting each to maintain its own tariff structure for imports from non-member countries. E.F.T.A. was not envisaged as a means of fusing the economies of the member countries.¹⁰ Within its limited scope, E.F.T.A. has succeeded in reducing internal trade barriers, and plans to abolish all those remaining by January 1, 1967, the same time as the E.E.C. customs union will be established.

E.F.T.A. has provided for its member states the possibility of keeping pace with E.E.C. internal trade adjustments, with a view toward the eventual joining of the two organizations. The E.F.T.A. members and the E.E.C. are in general agreed on the need for an economically unified Europe, but the means to be used have not yet been agreed upon. The negotiations for British entry into the European Community, though unsuccessful, provided an extremely useful forum for the discussion of means of joining the two organizations. In the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, it is likely that economic links between E.E.C. and E.F.T.A.

⁹ Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom. Finland is an associate member.

¹⁰ See *Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association*, November 20, 1959, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Cmnd. 906.

will be strengthened. The Western European Union, one of the oldest of the European organizations, was originally planned as a defense pact among the European countries. It recently received a new infusion of life and purpose as a quarterly forum for meetings between the E.E.C. member countries and the United Kingdom. In these meetings, the agenda has been widened to include the discussion of common economic and political problems.

The Council of Europe, which was the first attempt at a broad political framework for all Western European countries, has evolved into a vastly different organization. Within the framework of the Council of Europe, numerous interstate conventions are developed with the assistance of an essentially "European" body, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Foremost among these conventions is the European Convention on Human Rights, which allows individuals, under certain circumstances, to bring cases before international tribunals. They may charge their own or other member states with violations of human rights listed in the Convention.

POLITICAL IMPACT OF UNITED EUROPE

All European organizations are designed to lead toward political union. As President Hallstein of the E.E.C. Commission has said, this involves two initial problems: "The first is the expansion of the partial political union—already attained within the European Communities to other fields: defense policy,

(Continued on page 365)

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After describing the historical background of divided Germany, this historian points out that "any solution [of the German problem] will again, as in 1871, rest on a 'little German' formula. . . ." Although most Germans will prefer this to the present division, he believes that "There is no particular reason to believe . . . that it will be the last word on the German dilemma."

Germany's Search For Identity

By HANS A. SCHMITT

Professor of History, Tulane University

IN 1814, Prince Metternich insisted that Italy was merely a geographical expression. One hundred and fifty years later, one cannot say as much for Germany without being guilty of an oversimplification. Germany, a geographical phenomenon at best, is in fact only a question mark.

This is nothing new. The identity of Germany has been elusive throughout history. The word has never described a fixed political unit. England, Spain, France and Portugal have not always been exactly the same as their twentieth century counterparts either, but they have for several centuries found repose in the existence of governments whose authority was generally accepted. Germany, on the other hand, failed to shed the many-colored skins of multiple feudal allegiances which accounted for her political chaos during late medieval and early modern times. Since 1795, furthermore, Germany has been regrouped, rearranged, reorganized, unified, and divided even more frequently and incessantly. The results from turning point to turning point have been so transitory and unsatisfactory that one is tempted to award a kind of posthumous medal to the Holy Roman Empire. It may have been "an unclassifiable body comparable to a monster," as Samuel Pufendorf wrote in 1667, but at least it was able to survive for a thousand years.

However, nostalgia is out of place. The resurrection of the Empire is not an issue. What concerns us today is the premature passing of its many successors: the "secularized Empire" (1795-1806), the Confederation of the Rhine (1806-1814), the Germanic Confederation (1814-1866), the North German Confederation (1867-1871), the German Empire (1871-1918), the Weimar Republic (1918-1933), and the Nazi Interregnum (1933-1945).

This ceaseless flux has been accompanied by constant uncertainties and controversies over the political and geographical limits of Germany. Should a united Germany include German-Austria, which is of course the same as asking whether ethnic and political boundaries must always coincide? The border between Germany and Poland remains a major international issue. In 1795, Warsaw was Prussian, but not part of the Empire. Does this give Germany a claim to the Polish capital? If not, then what of the Polish demands in East Prussia, all of which was part of the dominion of her kings until 1660? If these are rejected on the basis that an acceptable boundary should be drawn along national rather than feudal lines, it should be remembered that this is easier said than done. The Polish inhabitants of the Allenstein-Marienwerder district in East Prussia opted overwhelmingly for Germany

in the plebiscite of 1920. Self-determination is not always national.

Germany's western frontier has been equally impervious to the modern nostrums of nationalism. Here the issue has died, but German continues to be spoken on both sides of the Franco-German divide.

No less irritating have been problems of territorial division within Germany. In the chaos of legal and historical contradictions, no generation has succeeded in creating a stable pyramid of local jurisdictions. Most students of history, for instance, know that the Kingdom of Bavaria only reluctantly joined the ecstatic pilgrimage to Versailles in 1871 that resulted in the elevation of the King of Prussia to the ambiguous title "Emperor of the Germans." Even the republican era did not entirely dispel Bavarian *apartheid*. From 1920 to 1934, a *French* chargé, as well as an official representative of the German government, continued to reside in Munich.¹ It is less well known that the Bavaria of 1871 had herself been the product of a number of fairly recent "unifications." More than one-third of her territory had been acquired within the preceding century at the expense of such dispossessed church dignitaries as the Electoral Archbishop of Mainz, and through the absorption of free cities like Nuremberg and Augsburg.

In a period shorter than the history of the United States, then, Germans had not only achieved and dissipated national unity, but many of them—South and West Germans in particular—had changed allegiance several times.

PROSPECTS FOR 1964

What now is the prospect in 1964? Let us readjust our lenses to a closer perspective. This year, the Federal Republic has celebrated its fifteenth birthday. In terms of longevity

this, the largest German fragment, has passed the Republic of Weimar. Its prospects are good. When its predecessor democracy was approaching the end of its short life span, over six million of its workers were without employment; many million more were underemployed. In 1964, on the other hand, the government in Bonn reported 102,000 unemployed and 680,000 unfilled jobs. Weimar Germany faced ruin in a world of closed national markets and shrinking export opportunities. West Germany has just finished comparing the first six months of 1963 and 1964 respectively and found that during that short period alone her imports increased by 7.6 and her exports by 15.9 per cent.²

From 1930 to 1932, Berlin was successively racked by three major cabinet crises, immobilized by an electorate which refused a clear mandate to any political group, and paralyzed by a presidential election which prescribed senility as a cure for chaos by investing an 86-year-old soldier, Paul von Hindenburg, with another seven-year mandate. During the past year, the first generation of Bonn leaders has quietly disappeared from the scene. Former President Theodor Heuss and Social Democratic party (S.P.D.) leader Erich Ollenhauer have died, as has the dynamic 44-year-old Deputy Leader of the Free Democratic party, Wolfgang Doehring. Konrad Adenauer relinquished the chancellorship, though not the chairmanship of his party, after 14 years in office, and the Bundestag routinely transferred his authority to Ludwig Erhard who had previously been singled out for this distinction by the Christian Democratic Union (C.D.U.). So far, Germany's Second Republic has not known what a cabinet crisis is.

Often when the harassed voter of the Weimar Republic stepped into the polling booth he would have before him a ballot that presented a choice of 36 different political parties ranging from the Social Democrats to the Union of Wuertemberg Peasants and Vintners.³ It was a current joke that two Englishmen could always be counted upon to found a club, two Americans to draft a

¹ Hans-Joachim Schreckenbach, "Innerdeutsche Gesandtschaften, 1867–1945," *Archivar und Historiker. Studien zur Archiv- und Geschichtswissenschaft zum 65. Geburtstag von Heinrich Otto Meiesner* (Berlin, 1956), pp. 413–415.

² *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 10, 1964.

³ *Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutsche Reich*, 1929 (Berlin, 1929), pp. 483–485.

constitution and by-laws; but when two Germans met, their first impulse was to establish a new political party.

In the Federal Republic, on the other hand, national elections have occurred only at regular four-year intervals as prescribed by the constitution. The last federal election occurred in 1961, the next is due in 1965. Meanwhile Landtag (state legislature) contests took place in Rhineland-Palatinate, Lower Saxony, Bremen, and Baden-Wuerttemberg, and seemed to confirm that the long ballot is a nightmare of the past. Even third and fourth parties are stagnating in the ample shade cast by the two colossi, the Christian Democratic Union (C.D.U.), and the Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.). In Bremen the German party lost two-thirds of its previous vote and three-fourths of its representation. The All-German party lost all seven seats in the legislature of Baden-Wuerttemberg.

Nor was there much of a nation-wide shift in the races between the two frontrunners. In the predominantly Catholic Rhineland-Palatinate, the Social Democrats came in a closer second than four years ago. In Bremen, a Socialist stronghold, the S.P.D. held its own, while the C.D.U. doubled its share of the vote from 14 to 28 per cent. In Lower Saxony, both parties gained five and seven per cent respectively at the expense of splinter groups.

GERMAN CRITICS

The salient features of life in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1964 seem to be domestic peace of British dimensions, to which one must add an economic prosperity of American proportions. Waistlines are

⁴ Otto Schmidt-Hannover, *Umdenken oder Anarchie, Maenner-Schicksale-Lehren* (Goettingen, 1959), pp. 10-11.

⁵ Cf., his letter in the weekly *Neue Politik*, August 22, 1964.

⁶ Rudolf Diels, *Lucifer ante portas: zwischen Severing und Heydrich* (Zuerich, 1949), *passim*.

⁷ Hubatsch has made the point that even the Germany of William II turned its back on the sobriety and selflessness of the Prussian ethic. Cf., *Hohenzollern in der deutschen Geschichte* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1961), p. 94.

⁸ W. Wolfram von Wolmar, *Ein Requiem fuer Preussen* (Goettingen, 1957), p. 81.

spreading, automobiles are choking the highways, help-wanted advertisements tend to displace news on the pages of national and local papers. In a word: the Germans "never had it so good." Yet some of them are not happy. In the words of one critic, "most Germans no longer *think*. . . Few still have an aim in life. They lead the existence of dollar or ruble colonials, like Carthaginians who have been tamed and (currency) reformed. They are either men who work hard physically and mentally, or *bon vivants* of the boom, hypnotized by the latest stock market reports and night club entertainments. They are dynamic businessmen or indomitable crusaders for higher wages in the futile atmosphere of an over-organized welfare system. Their need for heroes . . . is satisfied by movie stars and beauty queens." This critic is Otto Schmidt-Hannover, Reichstag leader of the German Nationalist People's party during the closing years of the Weimar Republic. To him, the Germans of today are "men without country and without past."⁴

Rejecting the Bonn *status quo*, he persists in believing that the first Republican experiment was "the greatest crime against the future" of Germany; as a lonely survivor of a generation of Prussian conservatives who were overwhelmed by the brutal course of events in 1933, he still preaches the "idea of the Prussian state," "the only great idea which in recent centuries has proved just and viable."⁵ Schmidt-Hannover is no solitary voice. In 1949, the first chief of the Gestapo, Rudolf Diels, in his memoirs blamed Germany's degradation and defeat on the abandonment of Prussian virtues.⁶ Historians like Hans Rothfels, Gerhard Ritter and Walter Hubatsch have less stridently and less polemically broken a lance for the Prussian state and the Prussian character.⁷ Another publicist has reminded German readers that none other than Gustav Stresemann made German salvation contingent on a return to "the spirit of old Prussia."⁸

It is difficult to assess the strength of these variegated Prussophiles. Much of the Federal Republic is non-Prussian by origin and history, and presumably ill-disposed to

found a conception of paradise lost on the virtues of a former rival. But a certain disaffection persists everywhere. Whatever the political and economic balance sheets of Weimar and Bonn may disclose to the detriment of the former, the *cultural* confrontation raises this question: "Where is the Thomas Mann, the Stefan George, the Paul Hindemith, the Max Reinhardt, or the Bruno Walter of the Federal Republic?"

The Prussophile complaint against the materialism of Germany's Second Republic is often matched by similar and less answerable criticisms from among the present generation's younger intellectuals. These pessimists feel that Weimar Germany, and post-World War I Berlin in particular, was a place of spiritual ferment, of cultural and artistic creativity, whereas the case for Bonn rests all too exclusively on material output and a political stability which may be the product of widespread mediocrity rather than wisdom.

Such a complaint is beyond easy refutation. To the foreign observer who has had more than one earful of German complaints about Versailles, Yalta and Potsdam, the whimpers about her current materialism may merely prove that there is no pleasing Germans. Be that as it may, one ought to suggest a more objective response. From 1870 to 1940, Germany, France, Russia and the Scandinavian countries went through periods of extraordinary cultural productivity. In some instances this fruitfulness of the spirit was accompanied by a spectacular economic expansion, in others it was the companion of widespread poverty. In neither case does there appear to have been any demonstrable connection between the respective levels of material and spiritual life. Today, all these countries seem to be entering into a period of cultural decline. Their intellectual vigor may have been sapped by these fruitful years, or the long-heralded "decline of the West" may indeed have set in, even in the U.S.S.R. At any rate, the problem is not uniquely German, and the citizens of the Bonn Republic, therefore, would do well to see their cultural predicament in a broader context,

and enjoy their superabundance of butter while it lasts.

GERMANY'S HISTORICAL CURSE

This advice would seem all the more appropriate when one considers that even without seeking desperately for spiritual concerns the Germans have *bona fide* anxieties. Rich, corpulent and successful though they may be, they have not succeeded in overcoming the nation's historical curse: division. Instead of one Germany, as in 1939, we have today four Germanies. First and foremost among these is, of course, the Federal Republic. It is a power. It is a significant component of the European Economic Community, NATO, Western European Union, and the Atlantic Alliance. It is once more among the great industrial producers of the earth. Like the United States, though on a more modest scale, it is looked to by emerging countries as a source of capital and skill.

Next in line is the territory which became in 1945 the Soviet Zone of Occupation. It is more commonly referred to as the "German Democratic Republic," a nomenclature which official and unofficial publications in the Federal Republic preface with a sarcastic "so-called." Its birthday is October 12, 1949, the day on which Otto Grotewohl formed his first cabinet. Therefore it, too, has outlasted the Weimar Republic. But compliments for this achievement must be qualified. The D.D.R. (Deutsche Demokratische Republik) came into being because the U.S.S.R. refused to join the tripartite action which created the Federal Republic. It is generally assumed that this refusal stemmed from the understandable fear that the voters of the Soviet zone would repudiate the Communist officials whose vehicle was the struggling Socialist Unity party.

As a result, the D.D.R. resembles Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union rather than Weimar. At the last general elections in October, 1963, the Socialist Unity list received 99.95 per cent of all votes cast. The area can also boast the distinction of being the only European country whose population has declined since World War II. At the

time of its foundation, the German Democratic Republic had a population of 18.9 million. At the time of the building of the Wall in 1961, it had dwindled to less than 17.1. Latest available figures for 1962 show a slight increase to 17.13, resulting from the forcible restriction of wholesale flights which accounted for the country's loss of an estimated 2.5 million citizens between 1949 and 1961.⁹

The third Germany is composed of territory situated east of the Oder and Neisse rivers. Most of it is today administered as part of Poland, the northern part of what was once the province of East Prussia as part of the U.S.S.R.

Finally, there is Berlin. Bonn claims it, although the city for obvious reasons continues to be occupied by the armed forces of France, Great Britain and the United States. The former capital's condition has been further complicated by the merger of its Soviet sector with the German Democratic Republic. Both the U.S.S.R. and its German satellite profess, furthermore, to consider the remainder of Berlin as belonging to the D.D.R., whose territory entirely surrounds the city. Western resistance to that claim constitutes the "Berlin problem."

UNIFICATION?

Until recently, there has been no prospect of reuniting Germany, and relatively little predisposition either inside the country or abroad to change this hopeless situation. None of the occupying powers saw good reason for paying anything more than lip-service to the cause of German unity. The Germans themselves had no time to concern themselves with anything more immediate than physical survival. Today, concern about the long-range significance of partition

has led to a more emphatic movement for unity among Germans, while the passing of time has visibly increased opposition to this continued fragmentation in the heart of Europe, in both East and West.

The Federal Republic continues to claim spokesmanship for all Germans. It continues to refuse diplomatic recognition to the D.D.R. and to eschew diplomatic relations with all powers that do. However, this policy has been modified by the conclusion in 1963 of trade treaties with Iron Curtain countries such as Poland, Hungary and Rumania. At the same time one must remember that there continues a fairly sizeable trade between Bonn and East Berlin, reduced only moderately by the building of the Wall.¹⁰

East Germany's attitude toward German unity has been modified by de-Stalinization. Since December, 1962, Walter Ulbricht has had no choice but to embrace coexistence. In the wake of this change there have been numerous demarches in favor of bilateral negotiations with the Bonn government, and on September 6, 1963, a suggestion was made for tripartite talks with Berlin as an additional participant.

Since the Federal Republic has invariably refused to respond to these gestures, its Eastern rival has lately begun to attempt measures that may eventually force a more flexible policy. On February 9, 1964, the D.D.R. expressed a desire for the exchange of trade missions with West European countries. In March, it entered into discussions with Czechoslovakia that were designed to bring about greater coordination between the two economies. Either design, if effectuated, would threaten to undercut Bonn in the West or create additional economic obstacles to future unification in the East. If the D.D.R. were able to normalize relations with any Western country, Bonn would have to make some gestures of recognition.¹¹ If the D.D.R. were to become part of an effective common market with any of her fellow-satellites, an entirely new dimension would be added to the problem of German unification.

So far these veiled threats from satellite Germany are only gestures. They may, how-

⁹ *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, 1963, p. 6.

¹⁰ For a detailed analysis, see Hans-Dieter Schulz, "Entwicklung und Bedeutung des Interzonenhandels, eine Zwischenbilanz zum 30. Juni, 1963," *Europa Archiv*, XVIII (1963), 481-490.

¹¹ An agreement with the D.D.R. permitting visits of relatives from West Germany to the D.D.R. and signed in September, 1964, obviously points in this direction.

ever, serve as an indication of what Khrushchev would have proposed during his once projected visit to Bonn.

The new Soviet leaders may favor some sort of negotiations acceptable to the two German governments, or a new era of aggressive diplomatic activity on the part of East Germany both in East and West Europe, designed to give the D.D.R. a degree of political and economic status which would make reunification in the future even more unlikely.

And what of the territories under Polish and Soviet administration? The D.D.R. has accepted the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's eastern boundary and affirmed as recently as February 1, 1964, that it has no territorial demands against anyone. Seven weeks after this pronouncement Chancellor Erhard pointed out that Germany has signed no agreement surrendering any territory that belonged to Germany in 1937, and that his government was in no position to settle the Oder-Neisse controversy by unilateral declaration. He indicated, however, that his primary diplomatic objective was to regain, not territory, but the confidence of Germany's eastern neighbors. This effort has sometimes been jeopardized by members of his own government. On May 17, his Minister of Transport told a rally of Sudeten Germans at Nuremberg that the Munich agreement of 1938, transferring the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia to Germany, continued to be a valid international agreement which the Federal Republic had no right to renounce. The Chancellor, no doubt aware that Hitler had broken that pact on March 15, 1939, disavowed this position at once by affirming that the Munich agreement was indeed null and void. At the same time the Bonn government repeated the hope that the Czechs would not refuse to allow the Sudeten German refugees the right to return to their homes.

It is of course possible that the question of Germany's eastern boundaries was settled on June 12, 1964, by the 20-year treaty of friendship concluded between the U.S.S.R. and the

German Democratic Republic.¹² This agreement reaffirms the Oder-Neisse line, and its signatories have repeated that the problem of German unity can only be settled by intra-German negotiations.

In the minds of the German peoples, the answer to Germany's problem is expected to come from the East. Once again, the name of Bismarck is being evoked, and with it the memory of the Alvensleben convention of 1863, by which the Iron Chancellor succeeded in neutralizing a potentially jealous Russia, thus making his campaign for German unity a single-front operation. Such a policy appears even more tempting today since there is no open opposition to German reunion in the West.

The German problem as created by the decisions of 1945 is entering a new and dramatic phase. Any solution will again, as in 1871, rest on a "little-German" formula, excluding Austria and Switzerland, Alsace-Lorraine, and, most likely, the territory east of the Oder and Neisse rivers. It is a solution which the overwhelming majority of Germans everywhere are bound to prefer to the present division. There is no particular reason to believe, however, especially in view of other European history, that it will be the last word on the German dilemma. If one looks for a solution to the German search for identity in terms of those found by France or Spain in earlier centuries, one shall have to recognize once again that in a final sense there is no answer to the German question. All one can hope is that the Germans will be willing to settle for the best they can get . . . if they can get it.

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¹² For complete text of this treaty see page 362 of this issue of *Current History*.

"Because he has served France well," writes this historian, "de Gaulle deserves well of the West in general and of the United States in particular." Does de Gaulle threaten European unity? This author believes that "the General's jealous maintenance of French sovereignty for a limited period of time need not hinder the growth of the new Europe."

The France of Charles de Gaulle

By EDWARD WHITING FOX

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TO AMERICANS preoccupied with the fate or future of Europe and the West, France has long been a cause for concern, often consternation. Vital to Europe's peace and prosperity because of her geographic location, if nothing else, she has until very recently appeared to threaten both by teetering on the brink of total disintegration. And the astonishing metamorphosis of the last few years that ended that specific danger has replaced it with another—taken by some to be even more ominous—namely, her irascible and inscrutable president, Charles de Gaulle.

When de Gaulle was swept back into power by the same wave of military insubordination which finally swamped the foundering Fourth Republic, there was no little apprehension among France's allies. He was assumed to be anti-European in his fierce devotion to French *grandeur* and was distrusted as an uncompromising authoritarian in both domestic and foreign politics. But the General's first three years in office provided surprisingly little confirmation for these fears. Moving with glacial deliberation, he edged toward a solution of the civil war which he finally imposed on the defiant French population of Algeria and the insurrectionary army. This impressive display of statesmanship—the population of metropolitan France as well as France's allies accepted his ultimate with-

drawal from Algeria as the inevitable and necessary conclusion of the war—taken together with the flush of prosperity the French had been enjoying since 1959—the first in at least 30 years—and the exemplary manner in which the government had decolonized its African empire—all tended to raise some hope that France would now take a constructive part in the development of what President John F. Kennedy was to call his Grand Design.

At the same time, however, General de Gaulle was gradually tightening his control of the French government, particularly through the referendum of October, 1963, which substituted direct popular election for the previous indirect method of choosing the President of the Republic. The gains of his supporters in the subsequent parliamentary elections were to prepare, it later appeared, for a major foray in foreign affairs. With his position thus rendered unassailable, he abruptly terminated the negotiations for Britain's entry into the Common Market by an unequivocal and untempered veto on January 29, 1963. Because such large—and possibly exaggerated—hopes had been placed in British membership, the General's blow seemed to shatter Europe and leave the Western Alliance in utter disarray. In further defiance of American leadership, de Gaulle has continued to develop an independent

nuclear striking force and has refused to cooperate with any form of multilateral force under American patronage. In January, 1964, he recognized Communist China.

The veto of Britain as a member of the Common Market, however, still remains the symbol of General de Gaulle's defiance of the established order of the West and the obvious point at which to begin a reassessment of the Alliance. First, it is necessary to decide what the General intended to accomplish and what he is likely to attempt in the near future. It is equally important, of course, to assess his strength, not merely in foreign affairs, but also within France, which must provide his base for diplomatic action.

The most important analysis of de Gaulle's foreign policy to be published in France, that by his original political patron, Paul Reynaud, reduces his motivation to the influence of chimeras and personal pique. Even though Reynaud builds his case on impressive reiteration of phrases from the General's texts, such as "from the Atlantic to the Urals," and by a distressing recapitulation of examples of the General's mordant response to slights, real or imagined, the formula must be rejected as superficial. At the time of the veto, public speculation dwelt heavily on the fact that de Gaulle had been pointedly excluded from the recent Bermuda meeting between President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, at which a new nuclear policy for the Alliance was discussed and formulated. And while it is all too easy to imagine the General's reaction to this fresh evidence of "Anglo-Saxon arrogance," it is very difficult, in retrospect, to believe it influenced his decision. One of the most marked traits of the General's character has been his capacity to swallow, store and channel anger. He does not squander his emotional energies in childish tantrums; and there had been no lack of warning signs—wishfully ignored by most—of what was coming. Nor does his repeated use of high-flown enigmatic phrases prove that he has no concrete goals, any more than his readiness to adjust tactical moves to immediate realities demonstrates that he has no ultimate objectives.

De Gaulle, everyone agrees; believes he has a special mission to reestablish France as a great power. What is less clear is how he intends to achieve it. An obvious clue, however, would seem to be provided by the great formative experiences of his early life: the First World War and the subsequent erosion of the Allied victory. Along with most other French officers, de Gaulle drew the obvious conclusion that France could not survive repeated wars with Germany. And from the interwar years he learned the danger of entrusting French security to her Anglo-Saxon allies and the impossibility of matching German power alone. Along with a large part of the French population, he came to believe that his country's only salvation lay in a united Europe founded on Franco-German cooperation and independent of British and American support.

It is true that the difficulties of the post-Liberation years and the success of Marshall Aid and NATO reconverted many Frenchmen to belief in an Atlantic alliance too. The two concepts of Europe and the Atlantic Community are by no means mutually exclusive or even antithetical; they are essentially complementary and the General himself has repeatedly insisted on his commitment to both. But his basic objective would appear to remain the joint Franco-German organization of an independent Europe, and this, he obviously believes, requires its own nuclear striking force under French control. The General is no pagan enemy of the true faith of Europe and the West, but he is a heretic who doesn't hesitate to advance his own personal interpretations of revelation.

To estimate the nature and gravity of the threat he poses, it is necessary to assess the character and extent of his diplomatic strength and reexamine both his objectives and our own positions. From long habit of underestimating the French we had tended to credit him with little more than a grim kind of nuisance value, until, staggered by his veto of Britain, we suddenly took him to be utterly invincible. Actually, he has proven himself a master diplomat with important resources and some real limitations. By all

odds his most important asset is his base in France. In spite of that country's record of apparent weakness it is, by its location, tradition and recent achievements, the natural platform for a leader of, and spokesman for, Europe. In addition, de Gaulle has a kind of secret weapon in his sense of history and his own historical mission which gives him an incalculable advantage in dealing with lesser men.

HAZARDS AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Any true measure of the importance of France for Europe should be based, not only on her spectacular economic achievements of the past five years—which in one dimension or another are more than matched by both Germany and Italy—but also on the magnitude of the hazards she has overcome. Nor should her less tangible resources be ignored, her ingenuity and inventiveness, her political and cultural traditions. It is curious, and most regrettable, that many Americans and most British have allowed themselves the luxury of contempt for the French. This made it too easy, at the time of their military collapse in 1940, for us, and particularly for our President, to write them off completely, a default in judgment which found unfortunate expression in the personal pettiness of Franklin Roosevelt toward the self-appointed leader of the Free French.

With the liberation of Europe, we discovered that France was at least a necessary communications area. The transition from war to peace was almost more treacherous for the French than the occupation. Political and economic revival were both slow and painful, but by 1946, constitutional government was reestablished and the Fourth Republic began to drag out its precarious but fruitful life. In these years, the French undertook the restoration and complete reorganization of their devastated and anachronistic industry. To the economic crisis of 1947 and Soviet offensive (the Czech coup and Berlin blockade) in 1948, we responded with Marshall Aid and NATO, which together may have saved France and certainly expedited her project of marrying French iron to German

coal as a base for a new united Europe in the now famous Coal and Steel Community.

But the creative brilliance of these plans was obscured and their progress was slowed, first by the war in Indochina and then by the apparently fatal civil conflict in Algeria. The inability of the French to win or to disengage themselves from the Indochinese war was taken as evidence of political and military incompetence, or worse—a judgment which Americans might reconsider more sympathetically today. Similarly, the struggle in Algeria seemed to confirm all our worst fears, particularly when the Fourth Republic foundered in political abdication and military insubordination.

The reemergence of de Gaulle seemed to many to place a final seal of bankruptcy on French politics and inaugurate an authoritarian and reactionary regime. It was at this juncture, quite fortuitously, that the Common Market produced its first flush of prosperity in France. This allowed de Gaulle to halt the chronic inflation and attach the support—often grudging—of a large segment of the population.

THE FIFTH REPUBLIC

The common reading of this script stresses the apparent chronic weakness of the French. But it could equally well emphasize the amazing vitality and resourcefulness with which they survived or surmounted each new crisis. The position of France in Europe does not depend—as we tended to assume—on geography alone. The idea of the new Europe was French; its construction owed a disproportionate debt to France; its economic success was aided by the French industrial renaissance. But beyond all this, France was destined to play a major role in Europe because of her political and cultural traditions. Even though a truly European society must develop out of European cooperation, it also will take its essential character from one of the existing national traditions, that is, from France or Germany.

The others of the Six have no real choice. Their concept of Europe stems, however indirectly, from the French Revolution; and

much as they count on Germany, they could not accept membership in a new greater Reich. For all their political instability, the French alone among the continental powers never renounced their democratic heritage and it was a Frenchman, Albert Camus, who—drawing on the experience of the occupation and resistance, first formulated an answer to Nietzsche's "God is dead" for the existential generation with his "but man is responsible." In matters of art and conscience, Paris is the accepted capital of Europe.

Because of the desperate accident of the Algerian War, the French transition from reconstruction to prosperity was generally obscured and her emergence as the dominant power on the continent took everyone by surprise. The fact that Charles de Gaulle was once again in control of the destinies of France at this particular juncture made the transition all the more dramatic. Whatever his limitations or aberrations, Charles de Gaulle is a major statesman, perhaps the only one still active in the West. He possesses the sense of history and the conviction that it is made by individual human determination, the basis of all political greatness. His grim conviction that he is not merely the custodian but the incarnation of the greatness of France has frequently made him appear ludicrous, occasionally maniacal, but it has twice brought him to control of his country in the teeth of what appeared to be insuperable odds and opposition. And when, with the Algerian war resolved, he again stepped on the world stage in 1963, he found the Alliance in a state of relaxed incoherence.

The great wartime statesmen were dead or in retirement; even the imposing leaders of the postwar era had all disappeared except Adenauer, whose days were running out. Not only was there no one on the continent who approached de Gaulle in stature; there was no one in the West. The English were sinking into a decline, the depth of which we have probably not begun to plumb; the United States had a very young president and administration, whose enthusiastic promise had not yet had (and was not to have) time to mature. Under these circumstances,

de Gaulle inevitably enjoyed an authority which verged on license.

REELECTION POSSIBILITIES

As long as he controls France, and until he is confronted with a more coherent and realistic opposition, de Gaulle will be a formidable force; but his position within France may not be as secure as it appears. His mandate as president of the Republic expires at the end of 1965. Between now and then, nothing but his health or age would seem capable of impinging on his almost unlimited authority, but that he will stand for reelection and win, is by no means as certain as he would have us think. For one thing, his most solemn public statements and private assurances, as even his closest personal aides have learned to their chagrin, are as often intended to obscure as to explain his real intentions. He is 74 and last spring underwent a potentially serious but apparently successful operation. At the time, rumors insisted that the "success" was overstated and in any case, at his age, each additional year measurably increases the chances of serious physical decline.

He is alleged, moreover, to be morbidly sensitive to the risk of tarnishing his reputation by remaining in office beyond his prime; and he has convinced his entourage that he will not seek reelection if he does not feel confident of carrying out the entire term of seven years. De Gaulle, with his instinct for power, would be the last man to admit the possibility of his retirement until he had actually stepped out of office. His comments on the subject are, therefore, of no value. The possibility remains that he may attempt another term, but it is by no means certain, and probably unlikely.

There is also the possibility, slight but real, that he could be defeated. For one thing, contrary to official propaganda and foreign assumption, he is not widely popular; and for another, he does not have a party. But, if he stands for reelection he will likely win, because his opposition is fatally divided, the old political issues have become irrelevant and the political parties and personalities moribund. If the country's prosperity con-

tinues undiminished, he can hardly lose. The Left, it is true, has already announced a common candidate, the popular mayor of Marseilles, Gaston Defferre, and launched, probably prematurely, an ambitious publicity campaign consciously modeled on American methods. By now, however, hardly anyone thinks he has a chance of being more than a "brilliant second."

Even so, with the new system of direct popular election imposed on the country by de Gaulle in the referendum of October, 1962, anything could happen. This is an electoral procedure which the French have tried only once before (with results that hardly recommend it) and which does not seem suited to their political organization—or lack thereof—making prediction especially difficult. The most likely cause of a revolt or upset, it is assumed, would be a loss of prosperity, and the most probable beneficiary would be some widely known and widely respected business conservative like Antoine Pinay.

The next, and perhaps more important, question is what would happen if de Gaulle withdrew his candidacy. The reason for trying to rally the opposition around a single figure like Defferre would no longer exist, and there would be a rush of all-too-willing candidates to the fore, creating a dangerous confusion. The Gaullists presumably would present the current prime minister, Georges Pompidou, who emerged as the General's acknowledged deputy during his illness last spring. A former manager of the Rothschild's Bank, Pompidou might well have the endorsement of the business community and stand some chance of winning as the safest custodian of the new *status quo*. It is important to recognize, however, that the Gaullists do not constitute a party in any ordinary sense. The famous U.N.R. (Union for the New Republic) is really little more than a voting label of the kind so common in French politics and might be next to useless in the new presidential sweepstakes. Even as president, Pompidou would be no Charles de Gaulle. It is doubtful if he would attempt to use the awesome powers the office now

carries, and even less likely that he would continue to receive the parliamentary support the General commands. The bulk of the U.N.R. deputies are opportunists and many seem to be nonentities.

The true Gaullists are a small group (one is almost tempted to say gang) of the General's personal disciples. Characteristically, they are in their middle 40's, of bourgeois background, well educated, and have fought either in the Resistance or with the General's Free French forces. Although some hold elected office, more are serving as key administrators, a fact which has given rise to a myth that they are creating a new technocracy in France. Actually, there has always been an element of technocracy in French government, and this has been greatly extended since the Liberation. But the real technocrats have been the followers of Jean Monnet rather than Charles de Gaulle, and their achievements have been most striking in the various Plans and the construction of Europe.

The Gaullists themselves insist, rightly, that they are politicians and that their function is to direct the work of the technicians; but they are politicians of a very special sort. Nurtured in clandestine fighting or in the service of an imperious leader of a government in exile, they have not been trained in, and apparently do not instinctively respond to, electoral politics. Some of them may learn, but at the moment it would appear that Gaullism as a political force will disappear with Charles de Gaulle.

What will take its place is hard to say. The secret of the Gaullists' surprising political victory in 1962 was first, of course, their symbolic role as guardians of the new prosperity. Second and more significantly, there was the sudden irrelevance of almost all other political groups and politicians. With the emergence of the new national, even international, economy, the traditional local politics of France completely lost its meaning, indeed even seemed to pose a threat to the well-being of the country. For this reason, many votes for unknown U.N.R. candidates were really cast against all-too-well-known politicians of the past. In 1962, it seemed possible that the

proletariat, in league with inhabitants of depressed areas, might put together an effective party of the Left, aimed at extracting a more proportionate share of the country's wealth. This could still happen, but at the moment the gradually increasing standard of living among the lower classes appears to have undercut this attempt at a new Popular Front and, in any case, its probable maximum membership appears less than a majority.

ABSENCE OF ISSUES

The most important political fact in France at the moment is the absence of political issues. Even the question of education, which is the most actively discussed, produces amazingly little disagreement. In time, differences and problems are bound to reappear. But it would seem likely that, when they do, they will be European, not merely French, in scope. All this may presage a political vacuum following de Gaulle's departure that could make for a dangerous transition, either by offering an opportunity for political adventure or by removing France, at least temporarily, from her present position of leadership in Europe.

This possibility raises the question of what France's friends and allies should want her role to be and suggests reassessment, both of French policies and of our own objectives. As the rejection of Britain's bid for membership in the Common Market recedes, it becomes increasingly apparent that the disasters it was believed to presage have not occurred. Particularly in France, General de Gaulle's contention that he served the best interests of Europe and the West has gained wide acceptance. The basis for this claim rests on the distinction, which was perhaps obscured at the time, between an integrated community and a "trade area." Most proponents of the New Europe, in fact most men of good will throughout the West, have sought the development of a single European body politic. In fact, much of the resentment against de Gaulle has derived from the assumption that his determination to preserve the integrity of France could become an insuperable obstacle to the creation of a true Europe.

Leaving this particular point aside for the moment and returning to January, 1963, it must be recognized that the British had no intention of merging their identity with that of Europe and that, therefore, their admission to the Market at that point might well have weakened rather than reinforced the cohesive forces of the emergent community. The British were clearly interested in trade and would have provided the post-Adenauer Germans with a welcome lead away from political unification toward mere commercial association.

To return to the problem of de Gaulle's threat to real unity, the answer would seem to be less disquieting. First, the process of organic development is already well underway and will continue unless it is deliberately stifled. The General's jealous maintenance of French sovereignty for a limited period of time need not hinder the growth of the new Europe. In spite of the fearful impatience of the "constitutionalists," the new society will grow with time and use and national sovereignties will wither away as their traditional functions are replaced. The European political community will emerge as the inevitable problems attendant on economic growth and integration require political solution. Unless the Market is broken up or submerged in a loose trading association, it will survive, if indeed it is ever called on to face a crisis of sovereignty, because it will already have sunk deep roots in the economy and society of Europe. Few Frenchmen will be willing to risk their new way of life for the shibboleth of sovereignty.

Even acceptance of de Gaulle's policy for Europe, however, does not justify his defiance of American leadership at the risk of disrupting the Alliance. He has continually harassed the NATO command; he has refused to join a multilateral nuclear force and has continued to build his own; he has publicly criticized American policies; and, finally, he has recognized the People's Republic of China. In all of these, de Gaulle's style has been lamentable. The manner in which he has acted in itself constitutes a threat to Western cooperation, but our very helplessness

ness before his provocations suggests that our own policies may be wanting.

Are we also still preparing for the last war? As Senator William Fulbright so eloquently stated, American foreign policy is based as much in myth as in reality, a kind of weakness for which de Gaulle has a lethal instinct. The formative experience in world affairs for most Americans was not the First but the Second World War and the lessons we learned were that appeasement did not work but that coordinated efforts against a common enemy were crowned with victory. We are now determined to preserve that victory by the same means with the result that we seem—to many Europeans—more interested in maintaining the common enemy than turning our common efforts to more creative uses.

The cold war, that cornerstone and staple of American politics, appears in Europe to have thawed to a mere state of cool relations at worst. NATO and American tutelage, therefore, seem out of date. This is not to say that close and free cooperation among the powers of the West is not the necessary condition to peace and freedom in the world, but that the nature of these countries, the cooperation and the world have all changed and are changing with ever greater speed. The late President Kennedy once said that he thought his particular qualification for the high office he was then seeking was the "sense of history." This may well have been true, but if so, it is too bad he did not remember Thucydides when he was drafting his Grand Design. If he had, he might have recognized that what he called an alliance was, in effect, a Delian League. The English, in their unfortunate relaxation, have asked nothing better than to be favored clients, but as we may learn, clients do not make dependable allies. De Gaulle has been trying to force us to recognize the essential character of a true alliance.

Even his "*force de frappe*," which seems to confirm his critics' most serious charges of irresponsibility, makes sense in terms of our own lack of realism. The French did not, as we often imply, create the nightmare of nuclear proliferation. This, as information from

China emphasizes, will occur. In a world of nuclear stalemate the French have undeniably strengthened their own position and at the same time emphasized the sterility and danger of our policy. Our charges of nuclear irresponsibility are not well received by people who were helpless bystanders and possible victims of our Cuba crisis. Fortunately, there is evidence that American policymakers learned from that chilling experience and are struggling manfully to deal with the nuclear problem in its grim entirety. It is inconceivable that the French could or would pose a serious obstacle to effective general disarmament.

The gesture of public dismay with which we greeted the General's recent recognition of Red China offers one more, if less serious, illustration of our vulnerability to political myths. At the time, highly placed diplomatic officers in Washington freely volunteered, off the record, that the General had done us a genuine service by this move, since it was obvious that China must be brought into the fullest possible diplomatic communication with the rest of the world and that only our antiquated political mythology made it impossible for us to take the lead ourselves.

It is tragic that so many American statesmen have so consistently exacerbated the morbid sensibilities of Charles de Gaulle, making personal cooperation between his government and ours all but impossible. But the tensions between the two countries have always been worst at the surface. Fundamentally, our aims and interests are never far

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"Whether the new [Italian] government could develop real internal stability depended . . . upon a number of outside factors," writes this specialist, "but first and foremost upon the distribution of power within the two major coalition parties."

Italy's Coalition Government

By EDGAR R. ROSEN

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ITALY's most significant political experiment since the fall of fascism, the present center-left coalition of Christian Democrats, Socialists, Social Democrats and Republicans, is now in its crucial phase. The next few months may tell whether the attempt to consolidate the democratic order through a vast program of social and economic reforms has any chance to succeed or whether the complacent words of French President Charles de Gaulle concerning the breakdown of parliamentary government in Italy are going to become reality. Regardless of the ultimate accuracy of this dismal forecast there is little doubt that a failure of the present coalition would radicalize Italian political life. It would further strengthen the Communists and possibly, the Neofascists as well. The final result might be a political climate favorable to authoritarian or semi-authoritarian experimentation.

Any assessment of the probability of such developments must take into consideration the stability of the two center-left governments headed by Premier Aldo Moro since the end of 1963. When the relatively young professor of law and former secretary of the Christian Democratic party formed his first government in December, 1963, the men who had helped put him in office hoped to spend the next few years reforming and modernizing the social structure of Italy through the building of a new welfare state based on

social justice and security. More than half a decade of gradual and careful preparation seemed to have come to a positive conclusion. The Christian Democratic party had finally been brought to the point of complete official collaboration with the Socialists. The Socialist party in turn, after years of an exhausting struggle between its autonomist and maximalist wings, appeared to be anchored to a coalition program which it could support without betraying its fundamental political principles.

For Italy, this was indeed an event of almost revolutionary significance. Sixteen years after the Resistance-inspired anti-fascist coalition of the immediate postwar era had collapsed, Christian Democrats and Socialists again were joining hands to tackle the fundamental issues of Italian public life. Politically, both sides seemed about to come to grips with the reality of Communist strength in Italy. It was clear that any attempt to make the Italian Republic a functioning democratic order would have to face the problem of Italian communism and its millions of voters kept isolated from full participation in the democratic process. The underlying necessity was to convince large parts of the working class that their future could be entrusted more constructively to the center-left approach than to Communist negativism.

The program that was to serve this purpose

had been discussed in great detail by the participating political groups. In its most important social and economic aspects, it envisaged an urban planning law authorizing virtual nationalization of building sites in order to end the economically highly dangerous land speculation of recent years; a reform of the antiquated tenancy system suffocating the country's agriculture; a tax reform as well as a program of old age assistance. Since a piecemeal approach could not have been reconciled with the requirements of the Italian economy as a whole, the agreement stipulated that a five-year plan be drawn up by the summer of 1964 to coordinate the various measures. This amounted to an unprecedented attempt at state intervention in order to liquidate once and for all the traditional Italian imbalances between North and South, industry and agriculture, urban and rural areas.

However, using the initial agreement as a starting point, the coalition actually had granted itself a period of grace of six months to prepare the necessary measures and test the strength of purpose of all concerned. Nobody could assume that this would be an easy matter. And, in fact, cautious observers were inclined to stress how inadequately Italian public opinion was prepared for even the most limited measures of planning and how some of the policies appeared irreconcilable with the traditional Italian outlook.

A CYCLICAL CRISIS

A further point bound to stir doubt and antagonism presented itself in the form of the economic difficulties already plaguing Italy when the new government came into office. They were hardly the result of the policies of the center-left coalition, as hostile opinion was only too eager to imply; rather, they represented a cyclical crisis of the national economy arising from the "economic miracle" of recent years. The government's announced intention not to lose sight of its long-range objectives while simultaneously fighting the inflationary trends of the Italian economy through short-term measures quickly ran into the powerful opposition of the

"economic Right" and its political, journalistic and bureaucratic spokesmen.

Deliberate attempts were made to portray the economic crisis as total disaster. It was hoped that general panic would force the government to abandon the reform in order to concentrate fully on stabilization measures. Economic difficulties were to serve as a pretext for the blocking of reform policies and for preventing the liquidation of privilege. The new course was rapidly coming under attack from Right and Left as it proved impossible to obtain the support of the largely Communist-controlled General Confederation of Labor for those anti-inflationary measures affecting the wage interests of labor. Finally, there were those moderate groups within the Christian Democratic ranks who seem to have joined the new political experiment chiefly in the hope of having a better chance to defeat it from within. They were only too willing to listen to expert suggestions that restoration of the strength of the economy must take absolute precedence over reform measures, and to give them the broadest possible interpretation.

Moderate circles were especially concerned about the programming proposals worked out by the Socialist budget minister, Antonio Giolitti. They thought they had discovered in these not an attempt to correct the market economy but an unshakeable resolve to impose upon it a planning system virtually East European in type with the purpose of crushing private initiative through that of the state.

In the long run, the government itself became increasingly divided. Not only did basic differences appear over the extent of reform but over economic stabilization as well. Was stabilization pure and simple, as recommended by conservative circles, the answer? Was it enough to eliminate certain negative aspects of economic development or were such aspects manifestations of deeper structural imbalances? In this way the issue of reform reentered the debate. The first Moro cabinet wore itself out trying to find the correct diagnosis of the disease and to develop appropriate therapy to fight it. The

situation was further complicated by the divisions between the more radical and moderate points of view that existed among both Socialists and Christian Democrats.

A NEW PROGRAM

It came hardly as a surprise, therefore, when the cabinet resigned on June 26, 1964, only a few days before Giolitti's economic development plan for the next several years was to be submitted to the Chamber of Deputies. In the light of the deep political divide that had emerged during the first half of 1964, the outcome of the crisis seemed surprising, at least on the surface. To be sure, the crisis lasted several weeks and a new agreement required ten days of uninterrupted party talks.

Yet the new cabinet, again headed by Premier Moro, was almost identical with the one that had resigned in June. Only one prominent figure, the Socialist budget minister, refused to compromise. Both he and the leader of his group, Riccardo Lombardi, the then editor of the party newspaper *Avanti*, had opposed sacrificing even a single item of the original reform plan or agreeing to certain postponements. The program of the new government, while largely a restatement of that of the first Moro cabinet, presented certain fundamental differences. Some observers, basically friendly to the center-left approach, felt justified in describing this program as "more realistic." Unquestionably, final agreement was facilitated by the willingness of the Socialists to recognize the priority of anti-inflationary measures. Giolitti's five-year plan merely was to serve as a starting point for further studies. The final version of the plan to be completed after extensive hearings and consultations was to be drawn up in such a form as to coordinate Italian economic programming with the needs of a free economy and membership in the Common Market. The nationalization of potential building sites was equipped with certain safeguards protecting private interests for several transition years.

The new government thus owed its existence to what appeared to be a genuine

compromise solution. The moderate elements had accepted the reform principle as such, while the progressive groups decided to support the priority of stabilization measures. As these would produce positive results in the economy, reforms were to be quietly and gradually introduced. Could this mean that moderate groups in the coalition had chiefly been interested in gaining time? Had the moderate elements among the Christian Democrats become reconciled to the fact that the center-left approach was more than a mere tool of political power and that it could function only if they proved willing to accept its character as a movement of comprehensive national reconstruction?

It was immediately obvious that everything depended upon the interpretation which each side gave the new agreement. Whether the new government could develop real internal stability depended, of course, upon a number of outside factors, but first and foremost upon the distribution of power within the two major coalition parties.

THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Distribution of power is an especially complex phenomenon within the Christian Democratic party. The *Democrazia Cristiana* of 1963 is a far cry from the well-integrated and homogeneous organization it was in the late 1940's. Immense changes have taken place since the days when the late Alcide de Gasperi presided over its destinies as its unquestioned leader. Today's picture is rather that of a "federation of factions" (*correnti*), each individually organized, administered and supported by a special propaganda apparatus of its own. Although its internal condition appears infinitely better than in the mid-1950's when the powerful conservative group, "*Concentrazione*," went so far as to conduct open political warfare against the directives of the party leadership, still the establishment of a general consensus is one of the most difficult tasks facing the party secretary and his collaborators.

To preserve an always precarious internal equilibrium has been particularly difficult since 1959, because none of the factions has

been in a position to win the support of an absolute majority of the party membership since that time. Unstable coalitions plagued by personal rivalries rather than deep ideological commitments have been the result. The situation has not improved since late 1963 when Aldo Moro abandoned the party secretariat in order to assume the prime ministership. In spite of his present eminent position and the fact that he is generally respected as a man of the highest intellectual and moral stature, he is now merely the leader of one of several factions rather than their highly regarded mediator.

THE DOROTHEANS

This is of the greatest significance with regard to the center-left policies because the relative majority group, the "Dorotheans," now controlling the party secretariat in an unstable alliance with the Premier, represent the typical moderate outlook. While they are proclaiming their allegiance to the progressive political formula, some doubt has been expressed whether they are praising it only to deprive it of its actual content.

Rather than ideologists the "Dorotheans" must be regarded as primarily interested in political power as such, a situation that does not necessarily promote harmony among their own leaders. Significantly, their recent failure to obtain an absolute majority within the Christian Democratic national council forces the Dorotheans—and the Premier with them—to maintain themselves in power through an alliance with one of the other party groups. Of these the only one wholeheartedly committed to the new political course is the party's left wing, representing primarily north Italian Left Catholics and trade union leaders. In spite of some aspects of political strength of their own resulting from the electoral outcome of 1963, they can hardly expect to dominate the party's policies as was demonstrated by their limited ideological retreat during the talks leading to the formation of the second Moro cabinet.

Very different is the position of the important faction headed by former Premier Amintore Fanfani, the actual initiator of a

limited center-left course in 1962 and unquestionably the shrewdest and most experienced political manipulator among the Christian Democratic leadership. Obviously resentful because of his removal from the prime ministership following the Christian Democratic setback in the elections of April, 1963, all of Fanfani's recent efforts seem to have been directed at weakening Moro's role as main spokesman of the party's center-left orientation. With the cabinet crisis of summer 1964, which drove the Premier closer to the moderate "Dorotheans" and the more cautious orientation of the new coalition program, Fanfani has regained much of his freedom of action toward the left side of the Italian political spectrum. This has considerably increased his chances of a political comeback in the near future. In any event, the renewed active presence of this dynamic political figure may confront the coalition in the long run with new problems of personality and policy.

NENNI AND THE SOCIALISTS

In contrast to the Christian Democratic leadership where the younger postfascist generation has been in almost complete control during the past decade, the political fate of the Italian Socialist party is shaped to a very large extent by the influence of Pietro Nenni, the last survivor of an earlier generation of elder antifascist statesmen. Whatever his official position within the party may be at a particular moment, his influence is bound to be extremely powerful. He may not represent the Socialist party in all its shadings of opinion, but he certainly symbolizes it and a very major part of its dramatic history.

Late in 1963, as a result of the Christian Democratic move to support a center-left coalition including the Socialists, the outcome of the battle with pro-Communists had been decided. The left wing, convinced that it had lost the fight, abandoned the party as Nenni was accomplishing the greatest political transformation Italian socialism had ever experienced in more than 70 years of almost unbroken opposition to the "bourgeois state."

What prompted the veteran leader's decision to end the close alliance between Socialists and Communists was not exuberant optimism concerning the immediate prospects of Italian democracy, but rather an old politician's skepticism. Italy, he felt, would be in no position for a long time to come to advance beyond the political constellation the Christian Democrats were offering. He was convinced that to make the question of socialism and liquidation of capitalism an issue would only facilitate a triumph of reaction. By entering the government, the Socialists would at least have a chance to tie the Italian political system to a democratic outlook. Further progress, if and when possible, would be easier under such circumstances.

This strategic concept could be seen at work behind the stand taken by Nenni during the political crisis of the first Moro cabinet. He was also convinced of the urgency of the reform program. But preservation of the basic political idea seemed more important to him in order to protect the possibility of future progress.

HOMOGENEOUS LEADERSHIP

At the same time, compared to the uncertainties prevailing among the Christian Democrats, the relative ease with which clarification was achieved among the Socialist leadership seemed impressive. In the party's Central Committee, the followers of the Lombardi-Giolitti group were driven into a minority position and compelled to abandon their posts in the government and party leadership. Socialist representation in the new government thus was made more homogeneous in line with Nenni's program. Undoubtedly, the remarkable degree of Nenni's statesmanship was one of the principal factors protecting the stability of the second Moro cabinet.

Yet in making this very important contribution, Nenni may have weakened his position within the party. Ever since the formation of the new government, signs of increasing differentiation within the compact party structure of recent years had been manifesting themselves. New right, center and

left-wing groups of the traditional type were reemerging. The way in which they were going to combine with and oppose one another in future party congresses was likely to open a new chapter in the relationship between Pietro Nenni and his political followers.

With the internal problems of the two leading coalition partners playing such a major role in the present and future development of the center-left coalition, it was only logical that the two smaller parties would find themselves relegated to a subordinate position. Of course, this resulted also from the structural and general political problems facing the Social Democrats and Republicans.

REPUBLICAN FUNCTION

Its limited size notwithstanding (it was represented by a mere handful of deputies in the parliaments of 1958 and 1963), the Republican party's function in the center-left coalition would seem to be to provide an element of intellectual stimulation. The highly original contribution made by its leadership to the social and economic methodology of the "opening to the left" was of the utmost significance in setting a pattern for center-left planning even though some of its most important concepts eventually fell victim to the pressures of coalition compromise in the summer of 1964.

In contrast, the Social Democrats demonstrated their political potential by advancing from the limited strength of 22 deputies in 1958 to 33 in the Chamber of 1963. But as these gains were concentrated primarily in the central and southern parts of the country, they brought into focus again one of the basic weaknesses of the Social Democrats ever since their secession from the Socialist mother party in 1947 to build a workers' party of moderate outlook under the Social Democratic banner. The party has remained largely a political organization of lower middle class white collar workers, craftsmen and intellectuals in the urban areas of northern Italy supplemented by a relatively thin layer of working-class representation.

Significantly a major aspect of the party's importance on the national scene has been

the personality of its leader, Giuseppe Saragat, who towers above the rank and file of his followers and collaborators. As one of the eminent personalities of antifascism, foe of communism and defender of private economic initiative, his role of mediator between Christian Democrats and Socialists in the center-left coalition had great significance from the start. Finally, Saragat's loyalty to the Atlantic Alliance appeared to give special meaning to the fact that he took control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in both center-left cabinets.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The impact of the center-left coalition on the country's foreign policy has been relatively minor, although it appeared to be one of the major stumbling blocks at the time of the formation of the first Moro government. In fact, the question of foreign policy appears to have been responsible for the final decision made by the Socialist left wing to break away from the Nenni party. But, ever since, unexpected harmony seems to have prevailed among the coalition partners in the field of foreign affairs. The relative moratorium in international relations during a year of American presidential and British general elections has been largely responsible, although the sudden heating up of the situation in the Gulf of Tonkin proved to be an exception, with the Socialists criticizing the government's support given to American measures. But on the whole, Italian foreign policy was confronted with virtually no international problem where a final choice had to be made. For the time being Rome, for instance, has escaped a possibly embarrassing choice in the question of a future multilateral atomic NATO force where Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Republicans might easily find themselves at odds with the Socialists.

Furthermore, the general weight of Italian decisions is bound to be minor, and widespread Italian belief notwithstanding, even an Italian policy of mediation could not carry too much weight in world affairs. The situation of the 1920's and 1930's under the Fascist regime was abnormal and a distortion

of the true Italian potential. Certain constellations of the past no longer exist. The famous former dichotomy in Italian foreign policy, the European versus the Mediterranean orientation, was buried under the rubble of the Second World War.

FRANCO-ITALIAN RELATIONS

There is clear evidence of some sympathy with Gaullist diplomacy among the numerically small but not unimportant Christian Democratic right-wing as well as in the complex political maneuvering of former Premier Fanfani. On the other hand, Italian diplomacy has maintained its rejection of Gaullist policies. Commitment to a positive development of Franco-Italian relations was made officially by the center-left government but always, it was pointed out, in the context of strengthening European unification policies. The meaning of this was made clear by the tendency to work as closely as possible with Great Britain and by repeated reference to a broadening of Common Market membership through British participation combined with a policy of expanding and consolidating European institutions.

Yet indications are not lacking that in line with recent international compromise proposals and its own more moderate program at home the center-left coalition may be ready to soften its former adamant stand in one significant respect. One of the most important personalities of the Moro government and of the "Dorothean" faction in the Christian Democratic party, Treasury Minister Emilio Colombo, urged the Christian Democratic party congress in September, 1964, to go ahead with all European initiatives even if it should prove impossible to make Great Britain a partner at this time.

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Describing Spain's progress and difficulties, this historian notes that "During the last decade, the iron hand of the dictator has been gradually relaxed as Spain has emerged from her isolation as an outlaw among nations, and has taken her place as a member of the Western bloc."

Spain Emerges From Isolation

By RHEA MARSH SMITH

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THE Spanish state, established by the Nationalist victory on April 1, 1939, is headed by Francisco Franco Bahamonde. The surviving remnant of the pre-World War II Axis, Franco possesses dictatorial powers as *Caudillo* (leader) of the Spanish state and Chief-of-State, as well as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Prime Minister, and leader of the *Falange Español*. His civil government, as constituted July 11, 1962, consists of a Vice-President, Captain-General Agustin Muñoz Grandes, and 17 ministers. Like all contemporary dictatorships, Spain has only one legal party, the *Falange Español*, directed by a National Council of 100 members. The Spanish *Cortes* (parliament), which was organized along corporative lines in 1942, prepares and enacts laws. Parliament consists of 441 members, but their authority is restricted to the approval of carefully prepared legislation rather than to the initiation of laws.

In 1964, Spain is not governed by a single constitutional document, but by a series of fundamental laws, which have been adopted since the establishment of the Franco regime. One of these, the Law of Succession, was approved by a referendum, on July 6, 1947, but it had previously been granted to Spain by the dictator. It is intended that the government thus established will be permanent; it can be modified or abrogated only by a national referendum.

In reality, Spain is still a monarchy without a monarch. There are two ostensible candidates for the throne, the 51-year-old Don Juan, Count of Barcelona, and his 26-year-old son, Prince Juan Carlos. In 1959, the 72-year-old Franco was reported to have advised a friend that he would not permit the restoration of a Spanish monarch during his lifetime and would not tolerate any agitation for either candidate for the throne.

Although Don Juan has been at odds with the Generalissimo for a long time and is known for his liberal opinions, he appears to be the more likely candidate if he outlives the Generalissimo. The third son of Alfonso XIII, he lives in Estoril, Portugal, and, on the whole, is the choice of most Spanish monarchists. It is reliably reported that he and General Franco agreed on his eventual succession when they met near Naval Moral de la Mata on the Spanish frontier, on March 29, 1960.

Under an agreement concluded in 1954, his son, Prince Juan Carlos, received his military education in Spain and completed his studies at the General Military Academy in Zaragoza, in 1957. He has since visited the United States, and on May 14, 1962, consolidated his position as a responsible candidate for the throne by marrying Princess Sophia of the Hellenes, daughter of Queen Frederika of Greece.

The failure of the two Spanish republics because of the chaos that attended them, the paucity of real republicans, and the lack of

experience of the Spanish people in democratic action give thoughtful Spaniards some cause for concern when they contemplate a choice between the monarchy and a republic. The monarchy, however ineffectual at times, is a well-tested institution, while the republic presents an unknown quantity in the equation of government. Lurking behind the governmental facade is the anarchistic individualism of the Spaniard, who seeks to evade the personal effect of the law and believes that once a law is on the statute books, it is not necessary to implement it.

The Generalissimo is letting nothing weaken his determination to perpetuate the regime he has so carefully established. He has resolutely opposed monarchist agitation. When in 1962, he named Captain-General Agustín Muñoz Grandes, Chief of the General Staff and highest ranking officer in the Spanish army, as deputy premier, his proclaimed objective was to assure a peaceful succession; his deputy would automatically become head of the government to direct a peaceful transition to a monarchy. At least the move makes less likely a dispute over the succession among rival generals.

The Spanish people may not agree with the Generalissimo on continuation of his dictatorial policies or even on the restoration of the monarchy. In the 25 years which have elapsed since the termination of the Spanish Civil War, a whole generation of Spaniards has grown up without knowing exactly what a monarchy represents. It has yet to be determined whether the younger generation will submit peaceably to the restoration of an institution with which they are unfamiliar. It is very unlikely that they will agree to the perpetuation of the dictatorship; even if the monarchy is restored, they will doubtless insist on a constitutional monarchy.

THE "THIRD SPAIN"

The strength of the widely mentioned but somewhat clandestine "Third Spain" has yet to be determined. It lost one of its strongest leaders when the universally respected author and physician, Dr. Gregorio Marañón, died on March 27, 1960. Yet a year later, the

work of the "Third Spain" for the restoration of a liberal government appeared to have matured. On July 22, 1961, eight non-Communist, anti-Franco groups agreed to merge their activities after protracted negotiations in France. The objective of this Union of Democratic Forces (U.F.D.) was total opposition to the Franco regime, without collaboration with the Communists, and the replacement of the dictatorship with a democratic government, either monarchical or republican. The new organization proposed the voluntary retirement of the Generalissimo and the establishment of a provisional regime that would permit a free choice between a monarchy and a republic.

Liberal Roman Catholics, on May 14, 1959, also formed a clandestine Christian Democratic Left party, with a similar objective: the substitution of a democratic government for the Franco regime. Until this time, Roman Catholics had been the closest collaborators of the Generalissimo. Despite the opposition of these groups, working underground, Franco is determined that a monarchy will be restored as a continuation of the Falangist regime, personnel and policies.

It is improbable that the *Falange Española* will have much influence on the constitution of the new regime, even though it is the sole political party in Spain. Some of its members have been the Generalissimo's closest collaborators and its social philosophy has inspired many social and economic reforms. On the other hand, it has suffered from its association with the dictatorship and has been gradually losing influence since its hey-day during World War II.

Police activity in Spain indicates an active Communist underground, both in the country and in exile, biding its time for the expected chaos which may follow Franco's demise. The existence of such a clandestine group is further substantiated by the circulation of prohibited publications and sporadic terrorist plots. The more numerous Spanish anarchists appear to be traditionalists with neither the will nor the opportunity to organize a real conspiracy in the face of the strong rule of the Generalissimo.

Since the sixteenth century, the governmental objective of centralizing and "Castilianizing" Spain has been a political problem. Two centers of regionalism, the Basque Provinces and Catalonia, which received regional statutes of autonomy under the Second Republic, periodically defy central authority represented by the absolutism of Franco and unity under the hegemony of Madrid. Madrid and Barcelona, the two largest cities in Spain, have long been rivals. In addition, Barcelona and Bilbao are industrial centers where the regional issue is often obscured and confused with the economic.

RETURN TO RESPECTABILITY

During the last decade, the iron hand of the dictator has been gradually relaxed as Spain has emerged from her isolation as an outlaw among nations,¹ and has taken her place as a member of the Western bloc. The first step occurred in September, 1953, when in three agreements Spain authorized the United States to develop, maintain, and use military bases within her borders in return for American military and economic aid. These agreements made Spain an ally of the United States. The air and naval bases were to be used jointly to strengthen the defense of the West against Communist aggression, but Spain retained her sovereignty over the bases and would receive them intact when the United States ceased using them. Although Spain was thus brought formally into the Western sphere of defense, the agreements did not involve the other Atlantic allies of the United States which were still opposed to the Franco regime. The Spanish *Cortes* unanimously ratified the agreements on November 30, 1953, and as executive agreements they were immediately effective for the United States. They were renewed in 1963.

In the ensuing years the United States has built three military air bases in Spain: at Zaragoza, now Headquarters of the Sixteenth Air Force, at a cost of \$75 million; at Moron

de la Frontera, at a cost of \$45 million; and at San Pablo, an Air Force supply depot, at a cost of \$9 million. A naval air force and carrier base has been constructed at Rota, on the Bay of Cadiz, at a cost of \$83 million and a 487-mile pipeline has been constructed from Rota to Zaragoza at an estimated cost of a billion dollars to supply directly the fuel necessary for the Sixteenth Air Force. In addition, these agreements have contributed an estimated two billion dollars or more to Spain in economic and military aid.

Spain's restoration to respectability soon became evident. In January, 1955, a Spanish observer was permitted at the United Nations; the organization from which she had been banned in 1947. On September 26, 1955, the Spanish government requested admission to the United Nations, a request supported by the United States, and was admitted by a vote of 55 to 0, with the abstention of Belgium and Mexico. In 1956, Spain, which had supported Egypt in her seizure of the Suez Canal, was invited to the canal conference, and, on October 1, 1956, she accepted membership in the Suez Canal Users' Association (S.C.U.A.).

Despite her alliance with the United States and her avowed anti-Communist attitude, Spain has not yet been admitted to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); but, on July 20, 1959, in connection with her economic reorganization, Spain became a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.). Subsequently, when O.E.E.C. was expanded, Spain became a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.).

A series of official visits also elevated the Franco regime in international esteem. The peripatetic United States Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, visited Madrid and conferred with General Franco twice, on November 1, 1955, and on December 20, 1957. He was the first United States Secretary of State to visit Madrid and he reaffirmed the spirit of collaboration between the two nations. President Dwight D. Eisenhower went to Madrid, on December 21, 1959, where he

¹ Spain was banned from the United Nations in 1947.

had a conference with the Generalissimo. A later Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, conferred with Franco, on December 16, 1961, and, in August, 1962, Adlai Stevenson, United States Ambassador to the United Nations, visited the Spanish leader in Madrid.

This international acceptance has been accompanied by a relaxation of the intransigent attitude of Spain toward many liberal matters. After 19 months of negotiation, Spain concluded a concordat with the Vatican on August 27, 1953. It reaffirmed Roman Catholicism as the sole religion of the Spanish people and guaranteed its teaching in all schools, but, at the same time, recognized the validity of the fundamental law which prohibited the molesting of persons because of religious profession. After the approval of the concordat by the *Cortes*, on October 26, 1953, Franco declared that Protestants were free to worship as long as their activity did not impede Catholic unity. Two years later, on June 18, 1955, the Madrid Court of Appeals recognized civil marriage with non-Catholics, which was formerly forbidden.

On March 5, 1958, the censorship of foreign news reports and comments in Spanish newspapers was terminated. A month later, the *Cortes* approved a law giving unions the right to negotiate directly with employers in disputes relating to wages and working conditions. Legal restrictions on Spanish women have also been modified and they have been given the right to control their own property.

General Franco has also tried to heal the wounds left by the Civil War by opening, on September 7, 1958, a memorial to the Franco regime in the Guadarrama Mountains. This huge cathedral, dug into the mountain side, known as the Valley of the Fallen, was dedicated to the dead on both sides during the Civil War. It was more formally opened on April 1, 1959, the twentieth anniversary of the conclusion of the Civil War.

THE PROBLEM OF POVERTY

Economically, Spain is a poor country; even when gold and silver poured into the peninsula from the New World, Spain was far from rich in her own right. Today an

estimated 31,339,497 people live in an area two-thirds the size of Texas, and the nation simply does not have enough wealth to go around. Under the impetus of American aid and her own efforts, the index of the Spanish national income has risen to 166.8 and the total national income is over \$60 billion; nonetheless, the per capita distribution of the income is only about \$360. Spaniards raise large families, averaging from four to eight children, and the government's policy has been to encourage this practice. The hardships generated by the high birth-rate have not been materially alleviated by emigration. During the imperial era, Spaniards could settle in the New World and remain under the Spanish flag. Even now, with the old empire only a memory, Spanish political exiles are received by Spanish-speaking nations. Unfortunately, however, immigration just about balances emigration.

Today, as in the past, Spain needs both water and capital; water to irrigate her agricultural efforts, and capital to make that water available. American economic aid has provided a great deal of capital for this purpose. In 1955, the United States was reported cooperating in the formulation of plans to irrigate 1,250,000 acres. Four years later, the Yesa Dam on the Aragon River was opened. It was designed to irrigate 648,000 acres and was considered the largest such project yet undertaken in Europe.

There are many demands for capital in Spain. At one time, foreign capitalists obtained mining concessions and took their profits out of Spain. The Nationalist government, therefore, adopted restrictions to prevent foreign investors from removing profits from the country.

There has been some concern in wealthy circles over the potential instability of the Spanish government in the event of Franco's death. In 1959, 369 prominent Spanish business and professional men whose deposits totalled about \$6 million, were fined \$2,786,000 for maintaining unregistered accounts in Swiss banks. This was part of a determined effort to stop the drain on capital by the practice of making heavy deposits abroad.

Spanish officials constantly reiterated the charge that American aid, steady as it was both economically and militarily, was insufficient. The restrictions on the control of foreign corporations and the removal of profits served to discourage the investment of foreign capital in Spain. At the same time, the consistently unfavorable balance of trade acted as a drain on capital assets. Spain had to import raw materials and machine tools in order to industrialize, despite these handicaps, Spaniards wanted to industrialize because they hoped to imitate the capitalistic nations (which the government pretended to despise), raise their standard of living, and provide employment for greater numbers of people.

The rate of exchange was stabilized at 42 pesetas to the United States dollar, but the free market rate was 57. With speculation on the exchange rampant and inflation impending, the government was forced to adopt a program of austerity, raise taxes, and devalue the peseta to 60 pesetas to the United States dollar, in July, 1959. As a result, the Spanish exchange structure was unified, restrictions were removed from trade and foreign investment, and the economy was made more flexible. In an effort to attract foreign capital, outside investors were permitted to hold a 50 per cent share in mining and industry, and greater freedom was permitted in the transfer of earnings.

Although the national debt has steadily increased until it is now about \$2.5 billion, the national income is sufficiently large in proportion to make the national debt appear not excessive. The principal necessity is to keep a sufficiently large specie reserve to maintain confidence in the currency. At the time of the devaluation of the peseta, the drain on the reserve had reached the danger point.

Foreign trade accounts for the heaviest loss of capital. In 1961, there was a \$3.6 billion deficit; a year later, the deficit was \$8.3 billion, principally because of an increase in the importation of manufactured articles. While, at this time, exportation of food products yielded a surplus, the balance of trade was upset by the importation of raw

materials, lubricants and gasoline, and manufactured articles. Such a situation would be materially alleviated if the reported discovery of oil in northern Spain resulted in the real production of petroleum, because it would reduce the deficit caused by the importation of petroleum products; at the same time it would provide Spain with a valuable export. As yet this hope is unrealized.

AGRICULTURAL DIFFICULTIES

Nearly half the total active population of Spain is engaged in agriculture and a greater proportion of the population is dependent on it. Agriculture provides the principal articles for export, but despite efforts to irrigate, the emphasis on industrialization reduces the attractions of agriculture. There is a marked migration to the cities. Madrid, long envied by Barcelona as the largest city, has now attained a population of 2,259,931, while Barcelona has only 1,557,863. The indices of both agriculture and stockraising have increased since 1959, from 123.5 to 149.2 and from 110.3 to 154.7 respectively (1953-1955 = 100). The Government's emphasis on irrigation will make more land available for production. In 1964, less than half of the potentially productive area was cultivated. Some of this is used for stockraising, but if it could be made agriculturally productive there would be a greater surplus for export.

Wheat and barley are the most important cereal crops produced in Spain, although in years of bad weather their production is likely to be greatly curtailed and Spain is forced to import wheat. The total value of the cereal production is nearly \$100 million. Other important Spanish agricultural products are grapes, principally used to make

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While emphasizing Scandinavia's ideological allegiance to the West, this author also underscores that broadening intra-Nordic cooperation is "a significant phase of Scandinavian development since World War II . . . the most prominent result [of which] is the Nordic Council formed . . . in 1953."

Scandinavia Today

By JOHN H. WUORINEN

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SCANDINAVIA is a convenient and appropriate rubric for Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden because of the marked homogeneity of these four nations. Their homogeneity, in many ways clearly enough contoured to set them sharply apart from other western nations in Europe, rests upon many factors and circumstances. Their political institutions are basically very similar, even though Denmark, Norway and Sweden are still monarchies while Finland is a republic. All four are genuine democracies. Their economic development has traced pretty much the same general pattern, and the same can be said about their political parties, their domestic and foreign policy purposes and achievements, and many other aspects of their national life.

As regards the economies of the Scandinavian lands, it is well to note at the outset that these nations are, contrary to what many a foreign observer has claimed, countries in which free enterprise, and not "planned economy," is dominant. This was emphatically brought out, incidentally, by the Swedish Pavillion at the New York World's Fair in 1964. The slogan and theme of the Pavillion, "Creative Sweden—Land of Free Enterprise," pointedly underscored a number of essentials knowledge of which is necessary for a proper understanding of the dominant configuration of Sweden's economy (and that of Scandinavia in general).

Outstanding among these is the fact that

about 94 per cent of the country's labor force is employed by private enterprise. The remainder is employed by the railroads (80 per cent state-owned), by state or municipally owned public utilities or by various mining or industrial establishments, especially in the defense industries, that have been considered appropriate for public ownership. Even if these cooperatives are considered "public"—actually they are not "public," but are involved, in general, in highly competitive fields of activity—over nine-tenths of the gainfully employed in Sweden are found in private enterprise.

This does not mean that government at the national or local level does not play an important part in the nation's economic life. Government enterprise has in fact expanded in recent years. The expansion of the public sector has been, however, relatively modest. Waterpower resources, state-owned forests (and some saw mill, pulp and other timber-based industries); airports, tobacco or liquor monopolies owned or controlled by the state, municipal activity in the housing field—these all contribute to the role of the non-private sectors in the economy of Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries. They do not obscure the fact, however, that it is private enterprise that dominates the scene.

Political parties and programs show pretty much the same pattern in the four countries. In each, five major parties dominate. Broadly speaking, they may be labelled conservative,

agrarian, liberal, social democrat and communist. The minor parties are peripheral. Even the larger parties have failed to gain enough support to make any one of them a genuine majority party. This is especially interesting in view of the fact that participation in elections is usually very active. The number of voters normally ranges from 70 to 80 per cent of the qualified voters (in the Swedish 1948 election the percentage was 82.7 and in the 1962 Finnish election, 85.1).

PARTY HISTORY

The history of Scandinavian parties and political contests underlines a great stability and absence of crises. Political landslides are unknown. The outcome of elections almost invariably records only minor changes in the distribution of seats in the national legislatures. The multiparty system also prevents sharp swings of the political pendulum. The prominence of Social Democratic labor during the past many years, especially in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, has also acted as a stabilizing flywheel in the political mechanism. In the case of Finland, cabinet changes have been frequent, but internal political stability since 1948 has been greater, despite the manifold difficulties that are the legacy of a lost war, than the ministerial changes suggest.

The decline of communism in Scandinavia has also contributed to the balanced political situation. The years immediately after 1945 gave the Communists a new lease on life; but by the late 1950's Denmark, Norway and Sweden had no Communist elements worthy of mention. In Finland, where the Communists rode the crest of the wave for a few years after the end of the war, and have managed during the past two decades to win 20-25 per cent of the seats in the legislature, they have held no cabinet portfolios since 1948.

One of the most conspicuous features of Scandinavia's political development during the past generation is the prominence of the Social Democrats. Before 1914, the Social Democrats were the leading political party only in Finland where they held 45 per cent of the seats in the parliament as early as 1913.

In the other three countries, the party remained a minority party. The next twenty years brought a significant change. In Denmark after 1929 and in Norway and Sweden after the early 1930's, the Socialists became the largest single group although they did not succeed in becoming a majority party. Also, after 1920 the Socialists rose to new importance by either participating in or providing cabinet leadership. Between 1920 and 1926 Social Democrats in all four countries had served as prime ministers, although none had enjoyed majority support in his national legislature.

Further advance for this party came after 1932. Sweden's Social Democrats, under Per Albin Hansson, reached cabinet leadership in that year and, with a minor interruption, governed the nation until the outbreak of the war in 1939. The war years meant socialist-led coalition government on a broad basis, but undiluted Social Democrat governments resumed control in 1946. Furthermore, the leadership of Premier Tage Erlander, the Social Democrat Prime Minister in Sweden since 1946, and his party was again confirmed by the election on September 20, 1964.

Norway has furnished a similar illustration for many years, although the Social Democrats in Norway have had to be satisfied with a less secure voting position in parliament than have their Swedish colleagues. Except for a brief interlude in the fall of 1963, laborites have held the fort in Norway since 1935 despite the fact that their representatives in parliament have not gained a clear majority position. The situation in Denmark has been, broadly speaking, the same. In Finland, the Social Democrats have been less important since 1945 than before the war. While Social Democrats have headed three cabinets since 1945 and have participated in several others, no Socialist Premier has held office since 1958. The reason for the relative weakness of the Social Democrats in Finland is that communism has captured some of the former Socialist vote, and that the party itself has suffered in recent years from inner rivalries and dissension that have sapped its strength.

SCANDINAVIAN SOCIALISM

Meantime, the essence and purposes of Scandinavian socialism—no reference is made, in this connection, to communism—have markedly changed. Originally the ideology and goals of the Socialists were those defined by Marx, Engels and other German formulators and interpreters of the gospel of St. Marx. Partly before World War I and especially since 1918, the gospel has been greatly modified. The concept that class war and revolution are necessary midwives to "socialist" progress has been replaced by a gradualist, reformist attitude. Swedish Socialists no longer hold, as many of them did earlier, that the monarchy should be abolished, but accept the monarchy as a useful and congenial aspect of the life of the nation. In 1963 the Danish Social Democrat party congress rejected, with only a single vote objecting, a proposal for a republican constitution and also rejected a motion urging the separation of state and church. Norwegian laborites have likewise been anchored, especially since 1940, to moorings different from those found congenial in the early years of the Norwegian political labor movement. Finnish Social Democrats have been, for well over two decades, the most tenacious opponents of the program and endeavors of the Communists who alone still man the positions of militant Marxism, long since abandoned by modern Social Democracy in most corners of the world.

The end result of these changes is that Scandinavian Socialist laborites now accept peaceful reform as the goal to be sought. Preparation for the revolutionary overthrow of the "capitalist system" is no longer on the program. Nationalization of industries, or other parts of the national economy, in order to change from a system of "production for profit" to a system of "production for use," has gone the way of all earthly things. Government or public participation in various economic enterprises is seen as a question that can be answered only on the merits of each individual case. Compulsory Swedish industrial accident insurance and compulsory national health insurance (since 1955), im-

portant and essential parts of an enlightened public policy, has meant direct government involvement in the insurance field. Certain iron mines in central Sweden, previously owned by German interests, were acquired by the state after the last war, thereby increasing to about 85 per cent government influence in the management of the country's iron ore resources. Other illustrations of similar involvement merely accent the *ad hoc* aspect of this area of government interest.

The stability characteristic of Scandinavian politics and government is matched, to a large extent, by stability in the national economies. This is true despite the fact that all four countries are dependent upon the outside world to a degree that makes continuing foreign trade not only desirable but essential. This is also true despite the fact that the economy of each nation has undergone marked change during the past several decades.

DECLINE IN AGRICULTURE

An outstanding indication of the nature and magnitude of the change is the decline of the relative importance of agriculture while industry, trade and commerce have become ever more important. Today only some 20-26 per cent of the population of the four nations are fully employed in agriculture. Denmark offers a striking illustration of the direction of this recent development. In 1912, agricultural products accounted for 88 per cent of Denmark's exports. By 1959 the figure had dropped to 48. Exports of industrial goods, on the other hand, had in the meantime increased, from 12 per cent in 1912 to 45 per cent in 1959. Denmark today is no less dependent on industrial than on agricultural exports.

Corresponding changes have taken place in the other Northern lands, although Norway's, Sweden's and Finland's agricultural production has always been, contrary to Denmark's, primarily for domestic and not foreign markets.

The Scandinavian countries have thusly developed, in recent decades, into large-scale producers of non-agricultural commodities.

They manufacture many of them, furthermore, in quantities far in excess of their own needs. Processed foods, chemicals, ships, machinery and other manufactured goods account for well over 80 per cent of Norway's exports. The basic industries in Finland—paper, pulp, other wood products such as prefabricated housing, machinery, and others—account for over four-fifths of the country's exports. In the case of Sweden, the products of the metals and machinery industry, ore, paper, pulp and others also wholly dominate the nation's international commercial exchange picture. And Denmark's contribution to non-agricultural, industrial production is surprisingly large and many-sided.

FOREIGN TRADE

It is therefore clear that these nations must exchange, in foreign markets, their excess production for a wide variety of raw materials and commodities essential for their growing industries and expanding consumer needs. Substantial foreign trade is a must. Dependence upon foreign markets—especially European markets—is unavoidable.

It is of course clear that Scandinavia's dependence on foreign markets means, among other things, that the foreign trade partners of North Europe are in turn dependent upon Scandinavia. Without exaggerating the implications of figures or the importance of easy comparisons, we might note a few facts regarding the trade between Britain and Scandinavia. In 1935, 7.8 per cent of the exports of the United Kingdom went to Scandinavia. The corresponding percentage for the United States was 6.3, for France, 4.9 and for Germany, 5.6. The combined population of Scandinavia at the time was 16,500,000. The situation has remained basically the same since the 1930's. Today the North, whose population is approximately one per cent of the total population of the world, accounts for about 5 per cent of the foreign trade of the world.

Implicit in Scandinavia's general economic posture is vulnerability to the ups and downs of the world situation in general: international disturbances and conflicts, especially between

the great powers, are not only likely but are bound to disturb the stability of the North.

NORDIC COOPERATION

A significant phase of Scandinavian development since World War II is the broadening field of intra-Nordic cooperation. Its beginnings go back to the middle decades of the last century, but it was only after 1918 that this cooperation assumed impressive dimensions. The Nordic Society, the Northern Inter-Parliamentary Union, scores of non-official professional, industrial and trade organizations, the national Scandinavian labor unions and such testified, after World War I, to the broadening area of cooperation. In 1934, the four governments and Iceland established special Delegations for the Promotion of Economic Cooperation. The Conference of the Delegations discussed a number of economic questions of common interest. Among the significant results of its labors was the publication, in 1937, of an important survey, *The Northern Countries in World Economy*.

In some ways the most prominent result of post-1945 Scandinavian cooperation is the Nordic Council, formed largely on Danish initiative in 1953. The statute of the Council defines it as a consultative body set up by the legislatures of the five nations. Sixteen members from each parliament—except for Iceland which sends five—constitute the membership of 69. Premiers, ministers of foreign affairs and other cabinet members, usually about 30 in all, also attend the annual sessions of the Council. The Council meets at one of the national capitals, in rotation. Regular meetings of the foreign ministers and others supplement its work.

The Council deals, in principle, only with "questions considered suitable for immediate and specific action." Military questions and the foreign relations of the five member-nations with non-Scandinavian states are specifically excluded from the Council's agenda. Being a purely advisory body, the Council can only offer proposals and recommendations to the individual governments. An indication of the importance of the

Council's function is given by the fact that, of the 186 recommendations it had forwarded to two or more of the five governments by the end of 1961, the governments had carried through 59 and had partly accepted 49 recommendations; in addition, the purposes of 17 others had been reached without governmental action.

The Council has played an important part in making possible a good deal of common legislation and other measures in the North: passports have been abolished, a common labor market has become a fact; and Scandinavian citizens enjoy a wide range of social security benefits in whichever of the countries they happen to reside, without reference to citizenship. The unique mutually beneficial arrangements invite the surmise that they may turn out to mark the emergence of a new Scandinavian concept of citizenship.

NO DEFENSE PACT

The increasing evidences of Scandinavian solidarity do not obscure the fact that many matters of national interest still remain, wholly or in part, outside the areas of co-operation. For example, no common defense arrangements or common foreign policy have yet emerged, and the indications are that the North will remain divided for a good many years regarding defense and foreign policy requirements.

A common defense alignment was discussed by Norway, Sweden and Finland in 1940. In 1941, Sweden and Finland considered the same question. Various developments connected with the war—the Soviet attack on Finland and the subsequent policy of the U.S.S.R., and Hitler's occupation of Denmark and Norway—prevented such plans from being carried through. Denmark, Norway and Sweden gave serious thought to a defensive alliance in 1948–1949. It was intended to place Scandinavia outside all big power conflicts. The discussions ultimately led nowhere: Norway and Denmark (and Iceland) joined NATO while Sweden chose "alliance-free neutrality" as her firm commitment. Finland was also adhering to strict neutrality and a "friendship-toward-

all" policy, with special accent on her relations with the U.S.S.R. It is clear, incidentally, that neither Sweden's nor Finland's choice in favor of neutrality was dictated by aversion to or enmity toward any NATO member-state, but by a desire to shore up national security in what was seen as the best possible manner.

COMMON ECONOMIC POLICIES

Post-1945 attempts to map out common economic policies turned out to be more successful. An official examination of the possibilities of a common tariff as a basis for a customs union was undertaken in 1948. It led to the conclusion that such a union was not feasible "for the present." Some years later, the question was tackled anew, and the Nordic Council's Helsinki session in 1957 considered it in detail. The Scandinavian common market project was overtaken, however, by the plan for a larger West European common market area culminating in the establishment of the European Economic Community (the E.E.C. or "the Six") on January 1, 1958. Another partnership pursuing common economic goals, the European Free Trade Association (the E.F.T.A. or "Outer Seven"), became a fact in 1960.

The E.F.T.A. originally included Britain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Portugal and Austria. Finland signed a special convention with E.F.T.A. in March, 1961, and became affiliated with the organization on July 1, 1961. The E.F.T.A. agreements provide for gradual tariff cuts by the

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The Benelux countries enjoy "a high degree of prosperity and stability." Nonetheless, says this observer, they share certain problems, the gravest of which "is the rising threat of inflation."

The Benelux Countries

By F. GUNTHER EYCK

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IN 1964, as in previous years, the Benelux countries—Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg—enjoyed a high degree of prosperity and stability. These small countries in the northwestern corner of Europe, with a population hardly exceeding 20 million, have proven themselves. As constitutional monarchies, they have achieved an effective balance between the executive and the legislative. Democratic processes of government and in their public life in general are deeply enough engrained to withstand considerable pressure (as do the monarchical institutions). Yet in spite of all this, none of the Benelux countries has been or is now without problems.

In Belgium, problems are more formidable than in the other two Benelux nations. The cardinal domestic issue is the Flemish-Walloon issue. It has its roots deep in history and manifests itself in many forms: political, economic and cultural. Basically, it derives from the fact that Belgium is geographically and ethnically almost evenly divided into a northern region of four Flemish provinces (West and East Flanders, Antwerp and Limburg), and a southern region of four provinces (Hainault, Liege, Namur and Luxembourg),¹ largely populated by French-speaking Walloons. A ninth province, Brabant, lies in the center of the country, and while its population is mainly Flemish, it contains the metro-

politan area of Brussels, which has a larger French than Flemish-speaking population.

The division of the people and country goes back 1500 years or more. But it became acute only with the formation of the independent kingdom of Belgium in 1831. At first, the Flemish movement, seeking more influence and rights, was almost exclusively cultural in character. French culture was indeed predominant throughout the country. French was the official language and widely used by the Flemish commercial and professional élite. Moreover, Belgium's industrial heartland lay in the Walloon provinces except for Luxembourg. Financial control was exercised largely by the French-speaking upper bourgeoisie of Brussels.

Before the end of the nineteenth century, the Flemish movement became more politically oriented. This trend increased during World War I when Flemish activists collaborated with the Germans, who occupied almost all of Belgium for over four years. In the interwar period the Flemish quest for cultural and administrative equality was largely successful. Linguistic equality was attained in 1932; a Flemish university at Ghent was recognized; more Flemings gained access to higher positions in the civic service, the armed forces and the judiciary as well as in the financial and industrial élite. In the diplomatic service, however, French-speaking individuals predominated.

In the wake of World War II, the Flemings

¹ The Belgian province of Luxembourg must not be confused with the grand duchy of Luxembourg.

renewed their drive for equality and the Walloons, in turn, felt themselves driven into a minority position. This shift was primarily due to economic changes. The coal industry, which once formed the mainstay of the Walloon economy, was badly affected by a number of factors.² The famed iron and glass industries underwent a marked decline. By contrast, not only was there a new and large coalfield opened up in Flanders, but new industries (including steel mills and machine factories) were also established.

Next to the economic issue, demographic and linguistic factors have clouded Fleming-Walloon relations. The ratio between Flemings (who were always in a majority) and Walloons has steadily increased to the disadvantage of the latter. In 1939, the purely Flemish provinces had a population of 3,848,225 and the Walloon provinces, 2,778,534. By 1960, the corresponding figures were 4,339,204 for the four Flemish provinces as against 2,865,221 for the Walloon counterparts. Flemings now outnumber Walloons better than 5:3 and are expected to increase their lead.

More important still is the fact that the Flemish language, akin to Dutch, is now more widely spoken (by 55.1 per cent of the population) than at any other time in the history of the kingdom, and it has become at least administratively and legally equal to French. Thus, the Walloons are now a definite minority; indeed, their fear of "minorization" is one of the most sensitive issues in the present stage of their prolonged conflict with the Flemings.

The government services now offer Flemings equal opportunity. In some instances, such as the ministry of education, two-fold and complete partition of Flemish and French services has been undertaken. Even the diplomatic service is now being restructured on the basis of full equality.

Most important, a number of linguistic

laws have been passed in the last few years under the guidance of Minister of the Interior Gilson. The first of these laws, fixing the linguistic frontier throughout Belgium along historic lines with some adjustments in border areas, divided Belgium into two major unilingual areas, replacing the former bilingual administrative and educational systems.³ The only exception is the Brussels area, where bilingualism continues.

A second language law buttressed the first in the matter of education. A third law dealt with the use of language in administration. A fourth law dealt with the language in judicial proceedings.

The linguistic laws deal, of course, with only some of the many aspects of Flemish-Walloon relations. In order to ease these on a broad and permanent basis, a reorganization of the Belgian state is now under consideration. Since the beginning of this year representatives of the three major parties—Christian-Social (P.S.C.), Socialist (P.S.B.) and Liberals (P.L.P.)—have met repeatedly to work out an acceptable formula which would provide for the transformation of the unitary and centralized Belgian kingdom into a federated state, in which the Flemish, Walloon, and presumably the Brussels regions would have full autonomy.

Despite difficulties, agitation for some kind of federalism continues from both Flemish and Walloon organizations. Among the latter the *Mouvement Populaire Wallon* (M.P.W.) is the most important. While it is not a political party, its supporters are in the main drawn from socialist and trade union ranks.

The Belgian Socialist party has struggled successfully to remain a truly national party even though its strongholds are outside the Flemish regions. Conversely, the Christian-Social party is strongest in that area. In addition, there is a Flemish nationalist party (*Volksunie*) which stands squarely for a federated state and Flemish rights, as do several other pressure groups such as the Flemish Economic Union.

The third national party of significance is the Liberal party, now reconstituted as the Party of Liberty and Progress, which is

² Among these were the inaccessibility of the remaining coal seams, the obsolescence of equipment and excessive production costs.

³ Throughout 1963, a number of clashes occurred in the border communes. Earlier Flemish marches in Brussels brought together as many as 100,000 demonstrators; Walloon counterdemonstrations were somewhat less well attended.

politically and socially conservative and strongest among the francophile business groups. The Communists, who are a small minority, have been further weakened by the Sino-Soviet rift. A pro-Chinese group has made some inroads among Communists in Brussels and a few Walloon cities.

In the municipal elections held in mid-October, 1964, the Christian Social party lost heavily; the Socialists also sustained losses. The P.L.P. made spectacular gains while the *Volksunie* gained specifically in Flanders and the Communists won a number of seats in the Walloon cities. This shift indicates a growing catholic dissatisfaction with the Christian-Social/Socialist alliance and a radicalization in the Flemish-Walloon conflict. As a result, and in view of the upcoming national elections, the future of the coalition government and settlement of Flemish-Walloon tensions are in doubt.

Difficulties other than those stemming from Flemish-Walloon relations have beset the Belgian domestic scene, at least temporarily. One was the doctors' strike at the beginning of 1964. It followed the promulgation of a new health law which extended free treatment to widows, war veterans, orphans and retired persons and fixed certain other fees. Negotiations ended with a raising of fees and some other amendments in favor of the medical profession. In turn, the health act (A.M.I.) was extended and by mid-July included an additional one million people.

A few major strikes have occurred among industrial workers but on the whole the economy has remained undisturbed and has retained its forward movement. The estimated four per cent growth of the GNP for 1964 was about the same as for 1963.⁴ Industrial growth was accelerated over that of the previous year. Steel production, one of the mainstays of the economy, increased by no less than 16 per cent in the first six months of this year.

Foreign trade, traditionally accounting for nearly one-half of Belgium's productivity, ran up to an all-time high in the first six

months of 1964. More specifically, trade with the E.E.C. partners increased to 62 per cent as against 45 per cent of Belgium's foreign trade in 1958. United States investments in Belgium likewise continued to increase. There are now over 300 American firms active in the Belgian economy and a considerable amount of American capital has entered the country.

Yet in spite of the continuing boom, or perhaps because of it, the Belgian economy faces several problems shared also by other West European countries, particularly those belonging to E.E.C. The gravest of these problems is the rising threat of inflation. Prices and wages climbed throughout most of 1964 in spite of countermeasures by the government including the raising of the discount rate to 4.75 per cent, the third rise within twelve months. By August, the price index reached 120.84 representing an increase of more than five points in less than a year. Since wages are automatically adjusted on a sliding scale in almost all economic sectors, the vicious circle of continued increase of both prices and wages is difficult to break.

Another major problem is that of over-employment. An ever increasing number of foreign workers has to be brought into the country—as in many other West European countries—to keep the economy going. Even during the winter of 1963–1964 there were only 30,000 jobless in a labor force of over 3.7 million. In some industries, such as mining, there are now more foreign workers than natives.

Among external issues the Congo still looms as the major issue both politically and economically. After a continued deterioration of relations between Belgium and its only but very substantial colony, an upturn took place in 1964. The Belgian government maintained good working relations with the Congolese government of Premier Adoula. After his resignation, Belgian authorities supported Moïse Tshombe as the newly established leader of the central government.

Much of the improvement in Belgian-Congolese relations was due to the patient and progressive approach of Foreign Minister

⁴ The Belgian GNP stands now at about \$14 billion per annum.

Paul-Henri Spaak; under him, relations with other African and Arab countries also improved. Diplomatic relations were resumed with the United Arab Republic after a break of over three years following the killing of Patrice Lumumba and the sacking of the Belgian embassy in Cairo. A similar development took place vis-à-vis Ghana with which relations had been broken in 1961.

Closer home, many Belgians continue to be ardent backers of European integration.⁵ An opinion poll at the end of 1964 showed nearly two-thirds of the respondents in favor of further integration. As pointed out above, Belgian exports to the E.E.C. partners constitute better than 60 per cent of the country's foreign trade. In only a few instances have the economic policies of integration been criticized.

Foreign Minister Spaak, long an ardent and eloquent champion of European federation and sometimes called "Mr. Europe," has recently given a new start to the dormant negotiations for such federation.

The Belgian public's attitude on de Gaulle is divided. Generally, the Flemings are more critical of the French than are the Walloons. Throughout the country the Socialists, among whom Spaak continues to hold considerable influence as a party member, condemn de Gaulle more sharply than, for instance, the P.L.P. French hegemony is occasionally feared and the lack of progress toward political union, for which the French President is often held primarily responsible, is regretted.

Belgian relations with the United States have greatly improved since they reached a low point after the proclamation of the Congo Republic and the brief rule of Premier Lumumba. While Belgians have in the main overcome their temporary animosities toward the United States and are loyal supporters of the Atlantic Community, their military contributions to NATO have been minimal. There is a deep undercurrent of pacifism, especially among Socialists; and military service is likely to be reduced further from its present length of twelve months.

⁵ See this author's article, "Benelux in the Common Market," *Current History*, November, 1963.

THE NETHERLANDS

Unlike Belgium, the Netherlands now enjoys comparative quiet in its political and economic affairs. There is no ethnic minority conflict and no problem so grave as to require a thorough restructuring of the state and substantial revision of the constitution of the country.

The less than half a million Frisians in the northern Netherlands and the belt of islands guarding its coast have their own language and cultural autonomy; otherwise they are fully integrated with the Dutch majority. The Netherlands has also been spared serious social conflicts. Furthermore, the loss of the rich and vast possessions in the East Indies to Indonesia has now been largely overcome and does not figure so prominently in the foreign policy considerations of the Dutch as does the Congo in the case of Belgium.

Nevertheless, the Netherlands does face problems of varying magnitude. No other issue has agitated the normally placid Dutch so much as the conversion to Roman Catholicism of Princess Irene and her subsequent marriage to a Spanish prince. The conversion drew considerable criticism from the various Protestant churches and more specifically from the *Hervormde Kerk*, to which the royal family belongs. Criticism, directed at the form rather than the substance of the conversion, was also expressed among the public at large.

Roman Catholics, who were once a small minority, now constitute 40 per cent of the population of nearly twelve million and hold many important offices of state, including that of the prime minister. The crown, however, is hereditary in the Orange dynasty which is Protestant in its main line. For this reason above all others there was some anxiety over possible constitutional implications since Princess Irene was second in the line of succession. However, Irene promised to forgo her succession rights when her engagement was announced in February, 1964.

Interestingly, the most disquieting feature involved was that the bridegroom-to-be was Prince Charles-Hugues de Bourbon-Parma. Although he holds French citizenship, the

Prince is a pretender to the Spanish throne and it is this Spanish background which proved so disturbing to many Dutch people including the Roman Catholics. The Dutch have not forgotten the 80-year struggle against Spain before the latter consented in 1648 to let one of its richest foreign possessions become independent. Animositities towards Spain continue to rankle and manifest themselves in various ways. Thus the Dutch have consistently opposed Spain's admission to E.E.C. and NATO. The fact that Princess Irene was married outside the Netherlands and under certain arrangements that caused the Dutch royal family to stay away from the wedding has aggravated these anti-Spanish feelings.

Other problems faced by the Dutch are less spectacular but more enduring and mainly socio-economic in character. One such problem is overpopulation of an area smaller in size than West Virginia and numbering over 912 inhabitants per square mile, one of the most heavily populated areas in the world. For quite some time after World War II Dutch emigration increased until it reached nearly 50,000 in 1952. Since that time it has fallen off—to a mere 6,000 in 1963.

The Dutch economy continues to experience boom conditions. The industrial growth rate reached four per cent for the whole of 1963 and in the first half of 1964 ran seven per cent ahead of the same period in the previous year. Industrialization plays an ever more important part in the economy.

Dutch foreign trade, always an important yardstick of economic growth for a nation which traditionally has been a leading power in global trade, greatly increased during the course of this year. In the first six months Dutch imports rose by 23 per cent over 1963 and exports by 15 per cent. Membership in E.E.C. undoubtedly helped this growth and West Germany constitutes the most important trade partner in spite of a continued coolness toward the Germans on the part of many Dutch people. United States investments in the Netherlands also continue to rise. On

the other end of the political spectrum and of the world, trade possibilities with Red China were studied and recommended by two special missions in the summer of 1964.

In spite of spectacular progress, the Dutch economy has not been free from the specific problems of many other E.E.C. countries. The biggest problem has been the continued threat of inflation. After a general wage increase early in 1964 prices followed suit and jumped 5 points on the index in April alone. The Government has taken a number of steps to counteract this inflation. Credits were tightened, with the discount rate raised in January to 4 per cent and to 4.5 per cent in June of 1964. Furthermore, the Government proposed a thorough fiscal reform program including a tax cut of one billion guilders to begin in January, 1966, limitation on further wage increases, and a substantial boost in old age pensions.⁶

Another problem is the lack of qualified labor. By mid-1964, the unemployed numbered less than 20,000 whereas there were nearly 150,000 positions to be filled. As in the case of other E.E.C. countries, the authorities have made a sustained effort to recruit foreign labor. Thus far about 60,000 foreigners, mainly Italians and Spaniards, have found employment.

In foreign affairs, the Dutch public and government continue to be ardent champions of European integration. Foreign Minister Luns and other ranking officials have repeatedly spoken strongly in favor of progress toward ultimate union. At the same time most Dutchmen prefer that Britain become a member of E.E.C. In fact, the Dutch are the staunchest supporters of ultimate British membership and an influential minority would rather see the breakup of "Little Europe" than the permanent exclusion of Britain.

There are several reasons for this fundamental Dutch attitude. The Dutch are Atlantic-oriented due to their location and the concomitant tradition of an ancient seafaring nation with overriding maritime interests. They are uneasy over the possible dominance of one or two continental powers,

⁶ The tax cut was ruled out temporarily by a Government statement in September, 1964.

to wit, France and Germany. The Dutch feel closer to the British than to many of their continental partners. Finally, as convinced and traditional freetraders, they would prefer a larger, albeit looser, association of European countries now belonging either to E.E.C. or E.F.T.A. to a tightly-knit but protectionist union of "the Six." For much the same reasons, the Dutch are more strongly and uniformly opposed to Gaullist policies than are the other member states of E.E.C.

By contrast, the Dutch are ardent supporters of the Atlantic Alliance. Although their contribution to NATO has been minimal, sufficient backing has been forthcoming for the multilateral nuclear force (M.L.F.) so that a small Dutch contingent can participate in the manning of the USS *Ricketts* for preliminary training. Whether the Dutch government will have adequate public support to join in later phases of the developing M.L.F. program is not yet certain. One major difficulty is the objection of many Dutch people to any sharing in any nuclear armament. There is also some concern that West Germany may acquire nuclear capabilities under joint M.L.F. arrangements. On the other hand, the Dutch possess a proud and long naval tradition which makes the concept of a nuclear naval force more palatable to them than, for instance, to the Belgians.

In other areas of the world, Dutch diplomacy has been active, particularly in Indonesia. For several years after the latter gained full independence, relations were notoriously bad and had, in fact, led to a complete break. However, since 1963, consistent efforts have been made by both sides to bring about a change and economic relations have improved. In April, 1964, the Indonesian foreign minister, Subandrio, paid a visit to the Netherlands, and as a result, an exchange of ambassadors was agreed upon, resuming diplomatic relations broken since 1960. Moreover, a technical assistance agreement was signed. The visit in May, 1964, of the Indonesian minister of heavy industry led to further agreements, including a promise to grant Indonesia a one hundred million guilder credit in 1965.

In contrast to the improving relations with Indonesia, those with the Republic of South Africa have steadily deteriorated although traditionally the Dutch have been on friendly terms with that country. The first white settlers in South Africa were Dutch; the Afrikaners are their descendants; and the language, religion and customs are much like the Dutch. Yet in recent years the close ties have been loosened, mainly as the result of the South African *apartheid* policy.

LUXEMBOURG

The grand-duchy of Luxembourg, third and smallest member of the Benelux community, in contrast to Belgium and the Netherlands, has few domestic and fewer foreign problems. Internal prosperity and peace rarely have been ruffled there since World War II. In fact, one of the real, though minute, problems of the small principality derives at least indirectly from its stability and tranquility—the distinction of having more old people than any other country in the world. Due to the regularity of life, the high standard of living, and comprehensive social services among the 318,000 inhabitants, nearly 16 per cent, according to the 1960 census, were over 60 years of age and an additional 15 per cent over 65 years.

Elections in Luxembourg traditionally take place with a minimum of disturbance in public life and result in a minimum of changes. The elections of June, 1964, were no exception. Voting is obligatory, as it is in the other Benelux countries; each voting Luxembourger has as many votes as there are deputies for his electoral region, of which there are four. The Christian-Social party remained largest in number of seats (22), but the Socialists gained four seats for a total of 21. In spite of continued prosperity, the Communists, who are not very radical, increased their strength from 2 to 5 seats. Only the Liberal party (Democrats) was a heavy loser, with its representation cut almost in half. The newly formed cabinet includes five Christian Social and five Socialist members. As in the other Benelux countries, there is a minister for the middle classes attesting

to the importance of this group in political and economic affairs.

The scheduled changeover in the Luxembourg dynasty should go as smoothly as the elections. Grand-Duchess Charlotte is due to step down from the throne by mid-November after a successful rule of 45 years. She will be succeeded by her son, Prince Jean, who has been carefully groomed for the succession. He is married to the sister of Belgium's King Baudouin, a factor which may draw the two countries still closer together. The two countries have been joined in an economic union (U.E.B.L.) since 1921 and have many features, such as religion, speech, and attitudes, in common.

Economically the little country with its already considerable wealth continues to make remarkable progress. Much of this hinges on its famed steel industry which in 1964 was an estimated 10 per cent ahead of the 1963 production. Nearly 98 per cent of the manufactured and crude steel are exported; E.E.C. partners are the main customers but exports to other countries have increased by 20 per cent, to about 125,000 tons per month.

Another important sector of the Luxembourg economy has been the tourist trade. A record number of nearly 375,000 visited the country in 1963. They brought to it, or rather left behind, a revenue of nearly 20 million dollars.

Agricultural output, which, together with wine growing, constitutes another important sector of the economy, decreased in 1964 as the result of an extremely dry spring and summer. Dairy production and the potato crop were especially affected as were the barley and oat harvests. Another and more permanent problem is that of the parcelization of land. Under the Napoleonic laws of succession each surviving child was entitled to a share of the land owned by the bequestor. Subsequently, holdings have tended to become smaller and more dispersed with each successive generation. However, under a new law, efforts are being made toward more consolidation of these holdings.

The Luxembourgers, like their associates in both Benelux and E.E.C., face the dual

problems of inflation and labor shortages. Up to now the Luxembourg government has managed to keep the threat of a spiraling inflation pretty much under control. The cost of living, however, has risen gradually and with it demands for wage increases. Luxembourg authorities are likewise much concerned with the need to find sufficient and cheaper labor, most of it from abroad. By August, 1964, roughly one-third (or over 15,000) of the labor force was foreign, chiefly Italian. Most of the foreign labor is employed in construction work rather than in the iron and steel industries which remain the preserve of native Luxembourgers.

In foreign affairs Luxembourg faces no major problems. Its people are staunch allies of the Atlantic and European communities. Probably the most important issue that the newly formed government faces is the possibility of the transfer of the seat of the Coal and Steel Authority from Luxembourg City to Brussels should the projected merger of the three executive bodies of E.E.C. take place.

Due to the proximity of France and the fact that most Luxembourgers speak or at least understand French, there always has been a markedly friendly interest in France. Thus, a certain sympathy manifests itself for Gaullist France today. De Gaulle is widely regarded with sympathy, or at least respect, and French positions have been supported in several instances by the Luxembourg government.

Although their internal problems vary, their heritage, and the economic union ratified in 1959, have welded the Benelux countries into an entity. Today the very term Benelux is symbolic of the union movement which offers Western Europe its greatest challenge and greatest chance.

F. Gunther Eyck has lectured extensively on subjects pertaining to current events in Western Europe and is specifically interested in public opinion research. He is the author of *Benelux Countries* (Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1959), as well as of numerous articles.

BOOK REVIEWS

WESTERN EUROPE SINCE THE WAR.

By JACQUES FREYMOND. (New York and London: Praeger, 1964. 220 pages, bibliography and index, \$5.50.)

THE POLITICS OF THE ATLANTIC

ALLIANCE. By ALVIN J. COTTRELL AND JAMES E. DOUGHERTY. (New York and London: Praeger, 1964. 248 pages, bibliography and index, \$5.00.)

These books are in a real sense complementary. Both are intended for the educated layman. Both deal with the problem(s) of the unity of the west; both are sympathetic toward that unity. One approaches it historically, the other analytically. One sees it with the eye of an Atlantic-minded European, the other with that of an Atlantic-minded American. And neither attempts to avoid or deprecate the real problems of achieving and maintaining that unity.

Of the two, M. Freymond's book is by far the more pleasant bedside companion; it makes fewer demands upon its readers. The author writes well and with penetrating comments. He has not attempted to be comprehensive; he describes his work as "a historical essay" rather than a history. But his basically historical approach makes for easy reading and provides a simple framework for his analyses. His book is an excellent introduction to the subject.

The Politics of the Atlantic Alliance is far more informative and comprehensive; it is also heavier reading. Messrs. Cottrell and Dougherty use a basically analytical organization and approach. In their analyses they have attempted to treat virtually every major political and economic aspect of NATO—and have very nearly succeeded. They have covered a great deal more than M. Freymond, and have done it well. But, because they have done so much in so small a book, the work is highly compressed, each

paragraph reading almost like a summary.

The complementary nature of the books extends to their concluding sentences. M. Freymond warns his readers that the crises of NATO have not yet been proven surmountable. Messrs. Cottrell and Dougherty exhort theirs to surmount them.

G. W. Thumm
Bates College

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. A CONCISE HISTORY.

By ALFRED GROSSER. (New York: Praeger, 1964. 150 pages, bibliography and index, \$4.50.)

For many years the series *Que sais-je* (What do I know?) has provided the French with nutshell presentations of everything from fruit to folklore. In this almost uniformly fine translation (by Nelson Aldrich) of one of its volumes, a distinguished French historian gives us, clearly and succinctly, the history of the West German state, beginning with its prehistory in the 1945–1949 years and ending with the changing of the political guard in 1964.

Professor Grosser passes in review the Republic's composition and its Constitution, its structure, the political institutions and parties that work within it, the problems—internal and external—it has successfully surmounted so far and those it may expect. The "economic miracle" of a country rebuilt from ruins to become once more one of the world's greatest industrial powers, the billions of dollars and millions of refugees that fed this recovery, the difficulties of division and the possibilities of reunification, the intricate issues of European cooperation and eventual integration—these are all tiles in Professor Grosser's mosaic.

Eugen Weber

University of California, Los Angeles
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CURRENT DOCUMENTS

Soviet-East German Friendship Treaty

On June 12, 1964, former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and Walter Ulbricht, First Secretary of the East German Socialist Unity party, signed a 20-year Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Cooperation. The text of this treaty, signed in Moscow, follows:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Democratic Republic:

Guided by the desire to continue to develop and strengthen the fraternal friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Democratic Republic, which is in line with the basic interests of the peoples of both countries and of the commonwealth as a whole;

On the basis of the fraternal all-round cooperation which is the cornerstone of the policy determining the relations between both states and which has assumed a still closer and cordial nature after the conclusion of the treaty on the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the German Democratic Republic of Sept. 20, 1955;

Expressing firm intention to contribute to the cause of consolidating peace in Europe and throughout the world and to follow unswervingly a policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems;

Fully determined to unite their efforts in order to counteract effectively, on the basis of the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of May 14, 1955, the threat to international security and peace created by the revanchist and militarist forces which are striving for a revision of the results of World War II;

And to defend the territorial integrity and sovereignty of both states from any attack;

Being of unanimous opinion that the German Democratic Republic, the first state of workers and peasants in the history of Ger-

many, which has carried into life the principles of the Potsdam agreement and follows the path of peace, is an important factor for insuring security in Europe and aversion of the war threat;

Striving to facilitate the conclusion of a German peace treaty and to conduce to the realization of Germany's unity on peaceful and democratic principles;

Guided by the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter;

Agreed on the following:

ARTICLE I

The high contracting parties, on the basis of full equality, mutual respect for the state sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs and the lofty principles of Socialist internationalism, implementing the principles of mutual advantage and mutual fraternal assistance, will continue to develop and consolidate the relations of friendship and close cooperation in all spheres.

ARTICLE II

In the interests of peace and peaceful future of the peoples, including the German people, the high contracting parties will unswervingly work for the elimination of the remnants of World War II, for the conclusion of a German peace treaty and for the normalization of the situation in West Berlin on this basis.

The sides proceed from the premise that, pending the conclusion of a German peace treaty, the United States of America, Great

Britain and France continue to bear their responsibility for the realization on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany of the demands and commitments jointly assumed by the Governments of the four powers under the Potsdam and other international agreements and directed toward the eradication of German militarism and Nazism and toward the prevention of German aggression.

ARTICLE III

The high contracting parties join their efforts directed toward insuring peace and security in Europe and throughout the world in accordance with the aims and principles of the United Nations Charter. They will take all measures in their power to conduce to the settlement, on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, of the cardinal international problems such as general and complete disarmament, including partial measures conducing to the discontinuation of the arms race and relaxation of international tensions; abolition of colonialism, settlement of territorial and border disputes between states by peaceful means, and others.

ARTICLE IV

In the face of the existing danger of an aggressive war on the part of the militarist and revanchist forces the high contracting parties solemnly declare that the integrity of the state frontiers of the German Democratic Republic is one of the basic factors for European security. They confirm their firm determination to guarantee the inviolability of these frontiers in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

The high contracting parties will also undertake all necessary measures for preventing aggression on the part of the forces of militarism and revanchism which are striving for a revision of the results of World War II.

ARTICLE V

In the case if one of the high contracting parties becomes an object of an armed attack in Europe by some state or a group of states, the other high contracting party will render

it immediate assistance in accordance with the provisions of the Warsaw Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance.

The Security Council will be informed of the measures taken, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. These measures will be discontinued as soon as the Security Council takes measures necessary for restoring and maintaining international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

The high contracting parties will regard West Berlin as an independent political unit.

ARTICLE VII

The high contracting parties confirm their opinion that in view of the existence of two sovereign German states—the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany—the creation of a peace-loving democratic united German state can be achieved only through negotiations on an equal footing and agreement between both sovereign German states.

ARTICLE VIII

On the basis of mutual advantage and unselfish fraternal cooperation, in accordance with the principles of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance the high contracting parties will develop and consolidate in every way the economic, scientific and technical relations between both states, to carry out, in accordance with the principles of international Socialist division of labor, the coordination of national economic plans, specialization and cooperation of production and to insure the highest productivity through a rapprochement and coordination of the national economies of both states.

The sides will continue to develop their relations in the cultural, public and sports fields, and also in the sphere of tourism.

ARTICLE IX

The present treaty does not affect the rights
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EUROPE TOWARD UNITY

(Continued from page 325)

foreign policy (the economic aspects of which are already unified in the European Economic Community) and cultural policy.”¹¹ This development will be based on the tradition of the present communities, i.e., by assuring that “plans for expansion . . . will present a genuine, independent embodiment of the Community’s interests.”¹²

The second problem facing Europe in developing a political union is an institutional one. The existing institutions do not yet possess sufficient strength and independence to manage European policies by themselves. Proposals have been made, acceptable to all six member countries, for the merger of the executives of the three Communities: the E.C.S.C. High Authority, and the Commissions of Euratom and the E.E.C. This single executive, with its headquarters in a single city, could play a more important political role. Later the Communities themselves would be merged. Secondly, proposals have been made for strengthening the European Parliament, a body now composed of members of national parliaments, by having a part of its membership directly elected and by increasing its powers of control over the European institutions.

These initiatives for increased political unification stem quite naturally from the European Communities, for the Communities rather than other organizations have made the most significant progress towards the unification of Europe. Nevertheless, most European countries not in the Communities plan eventually to take part in a European political community and seek to influence it.

The logical consequence of a politically unified and economically strong Europe is, of course, an independent Europe allied with the United States. To most European political leaders this result is both desirable and

satisfying after the long struggle for unification. Yet a debate is taking place over the new Europe’s policies. The French government would make, from a loosely-unified Europe, an independent political force not necessarily in a close relationship with the United States. Those who support this view argue that the United States has dominated Europe throughout its development and the logical consequence of a strong Europe must be independence from the United States.

Most European political leaders oppose this concept of Europe. Erhard, Luns, Spaak and many others favor a federal Europe joined with the United States in the Atlantic partnership proposed by President Kennedy.¹³

The outcome of this debate among political leaders in Europe still remains unclear. But it is safe to say that the European Communities have passed the point of no return. The European experience in the 1946–1964 period points to a close relationship between a federal Europe and the United States. Only in this way can Europe reach its objectives of peace and real political power.

THE FRANCE OF DE GAULLE

(Continued from page 338)

apart. Because he has served France well, de Gaulle deserves well of the West in general and of the United States in particular. If France did not exist it would be the first objective of our policy to create her.

Now, our concern should be much less with the threat posed by her president—who in all likelihood will concentrate increasingly on French politics until the presidential elections a year hence—than with the impending difficulties attendant on his eventual or imminent retirement from power, and the period of transition to a new political alignment in France, and even more important, in the new Europe. In the existing circumstances, de Gaulle’s greatest threat to the Alliance may well be the one he habitually wields in France: that he will stalk from the stage, this time forever, before France and Europe have found new effective leaders.

¹¹ Address by President Hallstein to European Parliament on June 18, 1964.

¹² *Idem.*

¹³ Speech at Philadelphia, July 4, 1962.

SPAIN EMERGES

(Continued from page 349)

wine; olives, primarily converted into olive oil; oranges, used in exchange with the United Kingdom; almonds; and lemons. Much of the citrus, olive and wine production is exported; i.e., oranges (\$1 billion); sherry (Jerez) wine (\$200 million); and olive oil (\$45 million).

Fishing has always been important in the Spanish economy, especially because of the activity of the mariners in Galicia and along the Cantabrian Coast. The value of the annual catch has steadily increased to nearly \$2 billion, in 1963, with the emphasis on sardines, cod, and fish products.

Under the stimulus of American economic aid, the industrial index of Spain has risen steadily, from 102.3, in 1959, to 134.5, in 1962 (1958 = 100). The principal basis for the increase has been the manufacturing index, which rose to 155.9 in 1964. Construction also contributed to the trend, but it was stimulated mainly by public works and housing developments.

Mining has been an important pursuit in Spain since Phoenician times. In 1963, the principal mineral products were crude iron (10.1 million tons); titanium (2.9 million tons); and iron pyrites (2.4 million tons). Actually the mining index has declined from 94.2, in 1959, to 93.1 in 1963, principally because of a decline in the production of copper, lead, tin, manganese, zinc, antimony and tungsten. The production of non-metallic minerals has increased. Other important Spanish industries are chemicals, textiles, paper and cement.

There are three important industrial centers in Spain: Madrid, which has become more important as the administrative center in the last decade; Barcelona, which is the principal center of the textile industry in Spain; and Bilbao, the center of the steel and iron industry.

The rise of prices in Spain has been steady and the inflationary trend may, in part, be attributed to American aid. The cost of

living index has risen from 111.3 in 1961, to 127.9 in 1963 (1958 = 100). Wages have not risen so rapidly as prices and this situation has been reflected in sporadic strikes. The austerity program demanded a greater sacrifice from the individualistic Spaniard than he has been willing to concede.

Spain has been plagued with problems accompanying an increasing cost of living, but she is not alone in this plight and is still one of the less expensive European countries in which to travel. This has caused a great influx of tourists. In 1963, there were 10,931,626 foreigners who registered their passports and another two million who were transients or registered for 24-hour stopover. The government has seized this opportunity to increase the flow of gold into Spain and has provided 3,411 first class hotels and pensions to accommodate the visitors. Spain is a living reminder of a glorious and intriguing past in which she was the dominant power in Europe: Perhaps tourism will furnish a means of escape from her economic plight.

Spain has made progress in the last ten years. Internally, she has continued to industrialize and to increase her production, despite international competition and internal problems. Externally, she has become one of the bastions of the West in the resistance to communism.

SCANDINAVIA TODAY

(Continued from page 354)

members leading to an elimination of all tariff dues by 1970.

Since 1960, intra-Nordic trade has markedly increased. The total Scandinavian sales of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden came to 18.1 per cent of their total exports in 1960; in 1963, the figure was 20.1 per cent. In 1958-1962 the increase in their exports to and imports from one another was no less than 70 per cent, while their exports to other markets grew by only 37 per cent and imports from them by 41 per cent. The Nordic market the four countries contemplated at the end of the 1950's appears to

be emerging as a reality within the framework of the Finn-E.F.T.A.

Denmark and Norway in NATO, and Sweden and Finland pursuing a strict policy of neutrality, suggest something of the role that Scandinavia may be said to play in the potentialities of the Western power bloc. As regards Sweden and Finland, it is difficult to imagine any situation, short of an attack upon their territories and a clear threat to their independence, sufficient to pull them away from the moorings of neutrality. It remains to be seen whether and to what extent Denmark and Norway will insist upon following their own judgment regarding NATO situations they may consider peripheral to their own interests and created by big power decisions in which they had no decisive voice.

Time alone will tell whether neutralism will ultimately mark a line separating Denmark and Norway from the rest of NATO. One thing is certain: no part of Scandinavia is ideologically outside the West. The four nations are in no meaningful sense "between East and West" nations. They are ideologically and culturally charter members of the democratic Western world.

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 362)

THE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN ITALY. BY SHEPARD B. CLOUGH. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964. 458 pages, appendix and index, \$10.00.)

For too long a time, Italy has been a neglected area of study by American social scientists. This is particularly true of Italian developments since 1945. Professor Clough's comprehensive study of Italian economic history since 1861 is an important step in the right direction of more knowledge in this area.

About half of this volume deals with developments prior to 1945. There are three lengthy chapters on post-1945 events. The

major internal reforms, economic problems, and political evolution are discussed in detailed, lucid fashion. Although of special interest to the economic historian, this study will also prove of great interest to the political scientist and sociologist, for it contains a wealth of well-analyzed, systematically organized data.

A.Z.R.

U.S.S.R.-EAST GERMAN TREATY

(Continued from page 364)

and commitments of the sides under the bilateral and other international agreements which are in force, including the Potsdam agreement.

ARTICLE X

This treaty will be valid for 20 years since the day on which it enters into force. The treaty will remain in force for 10 more years if neither of the high contracting parties denounces it 12 months before the expiration of the treaty's term.

In case of the establishment of a united democratic and peace-loving German state or the conclusion of a German peace treaty, the present treaty can be revised at the request of either of the high contracting parties before the expiration of its 20-year term.

ARTICLE XI

The present treaty is subject to ratification and will enter into force at the moment of the exchange of the ratification instruments, which will take place in Berlin in the nearest future.

Done in Moscow on June 12th, 1964, in two copies, each in the Russian and German languages, both texts being equally valid.

*For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,*

N. KHRUSHCHEV.

*For the German Democratic Republic,
Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic,* W. ULBRICHT.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of October, 1964, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Berlin

Oct. 30—Over 20,000 West Berliners visit relatives in East Germany on the first day of a 2-week visiting period, during which one-day passes are available.

Conference of Nonaligned States

Oct. 4—It is reported that U.A.R. President Gamal Abdel Nasser, host to the 47 participating and 10 observer countries at the Cairo Conference of Nonaligned States, has advised the Congo Republic against sending Premier Moise Tshombe to the conference; the conference's political committee has passed a resolution against Tshombe's attendance. The conference is scheduled to open tomorrow.

Oct. 5—President Nasser addresses the opening of the conference of the nonaligned states.

Oct. 6—Following his arrival in Cairo early this morning, Tshombe is confined to a guest house surrounded by guards. In a protest note, Tshombe declares he will leave Cairo tomorrow.

Oct. 7—The U.A.R. tells Tshombe he will not be allowed to leave until the Congo government withdraws the police who are sealing off the Egyptian and Algerian embassies in Leopoldville.

Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri urges that the conference send a special mission to Communist China to ask its leaders to abandon any plans for testing a nuclear device.

Oct. 8—President Nasser announces that Tshombe is free to leave. The Algerian and Egyptian embassy staffs in Leopoldville have been allowed to leave.

Oct. 9—Tshombe arrives in Paris, after leaving the U.A.R. earlier today.

Oct. 11—A final communiqué is issued by the Cairo conferees condemning colonialism and supporting peaceful coexistence.

European Economic Community (Common Market)

Oct. 1—The Executive Commission of the E.E.C. submits to the Council of Ministers its proposals for reducing and eventually abolishing the internal tariffs of Common Market members.

Oct. 20—President of the Executive Commission Walter Hallstein addresses the European Parliament (political body of the E.E.C.) on the program for complete elimination of Common Market internal tariffs.

Oct. 21—French Minister of Information Alain Peyrefitte issues a statement after a French cabinet meeting led by President Charles de Gaulle. He warns that France will withdraw from the Common Market unless a compromise is worked out on agricultural issues, primarily on a common price for wheat. French farmers receive a low price for their wheat while German farmers, with large government subsidies, receive a high price. France has offered to raise grain prices, if Germany will lower prices correspondingly, to achieve a common price.

Oct. 22—The European Parliament, meeting in Strasbourg, approves a resolution that the Ministerial Council of the E.E.C. work out an agreement on grain prices by December 15.

Latin American Free Trade Association

Oct. 20—L.A.F.T.A. opens its fourth annual meeting in Colombia.

Maghreb Unity

Oct. 3—The economic ministers of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya sign a protocol creating a permanent consultative committee to initiate programs of economic cooperation.

United Nations

Oct. 8—In a memorandum to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant for release to the 111 U.N. members, the U.S. declares that on opening day (November 10) it will move to apply Article 19 of the U.N. Charter to the Soviet Union. Article 19 states that members 2 years in arrears on contributions shall lose their voting rights in the General Assembly. The Soviet Union owes the equivalent of 2 years' contributions to the U.N.

Oct. 9—Soviet Representative Nikolai Fedorenko, at a special U.N. Security Council meeting to consider Malawi's application for membership, declares that the U.S. will destroy the U.N. by insistence on payment of Soviet debts to the U.N.

Oct. 22—At a news conference, U Thant suggests that the U.S., France, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R. and Communist China meet in 1965 to discuss nuclear weapons and disarmament. (See also *British Commonwealth, Great Britain.*)

U Thant praises the new Soviet leaders, Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksei Kosygin, and ousted Premier Nikita Khrushchev; U Thant suggests that Khrushchev issue a statement elaborating on "the circumstances leading to his exit." (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

AFGHANISTAN

Oct. 2—Parliament is dissolved after King Mohammed Zahir Shah approves a new constitution limiting the powers of the King's family.

ALGERIA

Oct. 17—It is announced that Hocine Ait Ahmed, leader of the guerrilla "Socialist Forces Front," has been arrested. He led the rebel drive in the Kabylia area.

ARGENTINA

(See *France*)

BOLIVIA

Oct. 27—In Santa Cruz, demonstrators attack the U.S. Information Agency center in an antigovernment protest. The U.S. flag is burned. The continuing outbreaks of violence are reported to be in retaliation for a state of siege imposed earlier this month and the ouster of some political leaders.

Oct. 28—Antigovernment demonstrations break out in Oruro. The Bolivian Miners Federation orders a 24-hour nationwide strike to protest repressive measures taken by President Victor Paz Estenssoro's government.

Oct. 29—A communiqué by the Bolivian government accuses the Czechoslovak Embassy of inciting antigovernment demonstrations. Bolivia announces that it has broken diplomatic ties with the Czech government.

BRAZIL

Oct. 14—French President Charles de Gaulle, on a visit, addresses the Brazilian parliament and meets with President Humberto Castelo Branco. (See also *France.*)

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, THE

Canada

Oct. 5—Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip, the Duke of Edinburgh, arrive in Canada for a visit.

Oct. 10—Several incidents occur during Queen Elizabeth's closely guarded visit to Quebec, where French Canadians have been demanding a larger voice in Canadian affairs. Elizabeth speaks before the Quebec legislature, where she expresses sympathy for some French Canadian demands.

Cyprus

Oct. 1—A Cypriot delegation returns from the U.S.S.R. where it has negotiated an

arms deal. The details of this pact have not been disclosed.

Oct. 2—The front page of *Makhi*, the most popular Greek Cypriote newspaper, is completely devoted to an attack against General George Grivas, commander of the Greek Cypriote national guard.

Oct. 3—It is reported that in Athens, Greek officials have expressed concern over an anti-Greek campaign in Cyprus to weaken the demands for *enosis* (union) with Greece.

Oct. 4—President Makarios departs for the U.A.R. to attend the conference of non-aligned states.

Oct. 26—The Nicosia-Kyrenia highway is opened under U.N. supervision. Some 334 Turkish soldiers are allowed to replace Turkish contingents in Famagusta. Turkish troop rotation was linked to an agreement to open the highway.

Great Britain

Oct. 15—The British voters go to the polls to elect a new House of Commons.

Oct. 16—With returns from all but one constituency reported, the Labor party wins 317 seats, the Conservative party, 303, and the Liberal party, 9. Conservative party leader Sir Alec Douglas-Home resigns as Prime Minister. Queen Elizabeth asks Harold Wilson, Labor party leader, to serve as Prime Minister. Wilson names Patrick Gordon Walker as Foreign Secretary; George Brown is named First Secretary of State and Minister for Economic Affairs; in effect, he is the Deputy Prime Minister. Among other appointments, the post of Chancellor of the Exchequer is given to James Callaghan; the Minister of Defense, to Denis Healy.

Oct. 17—Other cabinet members are named in the new Labor government. A newly created Ministry of Technology will be headed by Frank Cousins, Secretary-General of the Transport and General Workers Union; Wilson also creates a new cabinet post, Secretary of State for Wales, under James Griffiths. Returns from the last

constituency give the Conservative party an additional seat for a total of 304.

Oct. 25—Before departing for the U.S., British Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker says that some reorganization of NATO may result from the need to shape a policy providing for shared control of nuclear weapons.

Oct. 26—Gordon Walker confers with U.S. Secretary of State Rusk in Washington.

In a "fireside" talk to the nation, Prime Minister Wilson announces that a temporary 15 per cent tax on imports will become effective at midnight. Wilson also announces that tax incentives to promote exports will be introduced. The new Labor government is concerned to strengthen the economy; the British balance of payments deficit is expected to reach between £700 and £800 (\$1.96–\$2.24 billion) during this year.

Oct. 27—At a news conference in the U.S., Foreign Secretary Gordon Walker speaks favorably of inviting Communist China to participate in the 17-nation disarmament conference. Earlier he conferred with U.N. Secretary-General U Thant.

India

Oct. 12—Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri visits Pakistani President Mohammad Ayub Khan; in a joint statement they cite the need to improve relations between their countries.

Oct. 26—Shastri urges the chief ministers of the 16 Indian states to impose food rationing in major population areas.

Oct. 28—Food rationing is set up in the state of Kerala. The other 15 states agree to consider Shastri's proposal further next month.

Malaysia, Federation of

Oct. 27—A spokesman reports that the 5 bands of Indonesian rebels who invaded Malaysia in August and September have been largely wiped out.

Oct. 29—A Malaysian spokesman reports that 25 Indonesian rebels who landed in Malaysian territory this morning have been

captured; they were part of a 60-man group.

Zambia

Oct. 24—The British protectorate of Northern Rhodesia becomes independent. It will henceforth be known as Zambia.

BRITISH TERRITORIES, THE

Aden

Oct. 16—In this British Crown Colony, some 6,000 voters cast ballots for a 16-man legislature.

British Guiana

Oct. 9—The Governor, Sir Richard Luyt, gives up some emergency powers assumed in June because of Indian-Negro racial fighting.

Northern Rhodesia

(See *British Commonwealth, Zambia*.)

Rhodesia

Oct. 24—It is reported that Southern Rhodesia has officially shortened its name to Rhodesia.

Oct. 26—After 5 days of polling chiefs and headmen to find out how Africans feel about independence for Rhodesia, it is reported that the chiefs and headmen have approved independence under Rhodesia's present constitution supporting white rule. The chiefs and headmen are paid by the Rhodesian government. Britain has refused to recognize the *indaba* (secret meeting) of chiefs and headmen as an accurate reflection of African sentiment.

Oct. 27—Prime Minister Wilson warns Rhodesia against declaring its independence without Britain's approval; Wilson declares that the London money market would be closed to Rhodesia and that British companies investing in Rhodesia would be considered to have acted treasonably. Rhodesia would also lose its Commonwealth ties. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Oct. 29—Prime Minister Ian D. Smith declares that a favorable vote in the November

referendum on independence for Rhodesia will not pave the way for a unilateral declaration of independence; the referendum is to test white opinion on whether full independence from Great Britain is desired.

Solomon Islands

Oct. 5—The British Colonial Office announces that Solomon Islanders will be allowed to elect some members of their legislative council (formerly appointed by the British High Commissioner for the Western Pacific).

CAMBODIA

Oct. 6—At the end of an 8-day visit to Communist China, Prince Norodom Sihanouk declares that Cambodia will receive military and economic aid from Communist China.

Oct. 27—In a communiqué, Prince Norodom Sihanouk charges that the U.S. and South Vietnam are to blame for the incidents along the South Vietnamese-Cambodian frontier. Sihanouk threatens to break diplomatic ties with the U.S. if border incidents recur.

Oct. 28—In statements by U.S. and South Vietnamese spokesmen, it is confirmed that South Vietnam and the U.S. have been involved in border incidents with Cambodia. The U.S. spokesman confirms that a U.S. Air Force C-123 transport plane was flying over Cambodian soil when it was shot down on October 24.

CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Oct. 1—Communist China, with 3,000 foreign guests present, marks the 15th anniversary of Communist rule.

Oct. 16—A Chinese Communist communiqué announces that Red China has successfully tested its first atomic bomb. An accompanying government statement calls for an international summit conference on world disarmament.

CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

- Oct. 7—Some 40 South African mercenaries and 20 truckloads of Congolese soldiers recapture the port of Uvira from rebels.
- Oct. 13—Premier Moise Tshombe returns to Leopoldville; last week he was confined by Egyptian President Nasser to a guest house when he arrived in Cairo to attend the meeting of nonaligned nations. He is greeted by a massive demonstration. (See also *Intl. Conference of Nonaligned States*.)

FRANCE

(see also *Intl. E.E.C.*)

- Oct. 1—President Charles de Gaulle arrives in Chile, beginning the second half of his month-long tour of 10 Latin American countries.
- Oct. 3—De Gaulle's arrival in Buenos Aires, Argentina, is greeted by Peronist demonstrators beating drums and shouting slogans; de Gaulle reads only half his speech. It is reported that the Peronists have been advised to receive de Gaulle as they would exiled dictator Juan D. Perón.
- Oct. 6—Some 3,000 Peronists disrupt a motorcade in which de Gaulle and Argentine President Arturo U. Illia are riding. De Gaulle later leaves for Paraguay.
- Oct. 14—*L'Humanité* (French Communist party newspaper) publishes a resolution adopted by the Central Committee; the resolution states that no Communist party should interfere with any other Communist party, and that each party should adapt its policies to the needs of its home country. The subservience of Communist parties to the U.S.S.R. is denounced.
- Oct. 15—In Brazil, President Castelo Branco and de Gaulle issue a joint communiqué promising to work for peace and disarmament.
- Oct. 17—De Gaulle returns to Paris.
- Oct. 21—The Politburo of the French Communist party issues a statement revealing that it has decided to ask the Soviet Communist party to explain in full "the condi-

tions and the methods" under which Soviet Premier Khrushchev was removed.

- Oct. 24—A delegation of French Communists arrives in Moscow to ask for an explanation of Khrushchev's removal from power.
- Oct. 30—President de Gaulle, in a reply to a proposal by Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai, expresses his willingness to attend a conference of world nuclear powers.
- France and the Soviet Union sign a 5-year trade agreement for an exchange of goods valued at \$1.4 billion; France will extend \$356 million in credits to the Soviet Union for 7 years.

GERMANY, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF (East)

- Oct. 6—First Secretary of the East German Socialist Unity (Communist) party Walter Ulbricht announces that 10,000 prisoners, including those charged with serious political crimes, will be released; sentences of other prisoners will be lightened.
- Oct. 7—The 15th anniversary of Communist rule in East Germany is celebrated.

GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)

- Oct. 1—Visiting Premier V. G. M. Marijnen and Foreign Minister Joseph M. A. H. Luns of The Netherlands confer in Bonn on West Germany's proposals for political union of the Common Market countries.
- Oct. 5—West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard and other government officials arrive in West Berlin, where they will conduct government business.
- Oct. 13—The Soviet Union, in a note to West Germany, expresses regret for an incident last month in which a West German official in the Soviet Union was squirted with mustard gas.

JAPAN

- Oct. 25—After 6 weeks of hospitalization, Premier Hayato Ikeda announces his

resignation as Prime Minister because of his illness.

NICARAGUA

Oct. 6—The Congress repudiates the 1914 Bryan-Chamorro Treaty giving the U.S. perpetual rights to build an interocean canal through Nicaragua.

PANAMA

Oct. 1—President Marco Aurelio Robles is inaugurated.

PHILIPPINES, THE

Oct. 3—President Diosdado Macapagal departs for a trip to the U.S.

Oct. 6—U.S. President Johnson and Macapagal issue a communiqué affirming their commitment to defend “the right of the free nations of southeast Asia to determine their own future.”

POLAND

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Oct. 28—At a Polish-Mongolian friendship rally in Warsaw, First Secretary of the Central Committee Wladyslaw Gomulka urges Communist China and the Soviet Union to end their rift. Gomulka also states that Khrushchev’s ouster was “justified,” and that Khrushchev was present at the Soviet Central Committee meeting that voted for his removal.

PORTUGAL

Mozambique

Oct. 6—It is reported that in the last 2 days some 2,000 persons have fled to the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar; the refugees disclose that Portuguese troops are terrorizing the population.

Oct. 10—The Portuguese News agency (A.N.I.) reports that rebel bands have entered Mozambique from Tanganyika, as part of Communist subversive activity in Africa.

SPAIN

Oct. 19—Spain gives internal self-govern-

ment to her African possessions of Rio Muni and Fernando Po (which compose Equatorial Guinea).

Oct. 26—The minister in charge of the National Movement (*Falange*), José Solís Ruiz, at a televised news conference announces that workers’ councils will be formed at local, provincial and national levels; employers’ councils will also be created at the 3 levels.

SUDAN, THE

Oct. 24—It is reported that last week rioting broke out in Khartoum, and that the U.S. Embassy was attacked. A curfew has been imposed. In renewed rioting today, demonstrators try to set fire to the U.S. embassy.

Oct. 25—Antigovernment demonstrations in Khartoum result in 3 deaths; hundreds are reported arrested. Tanks and soldiers guard Khartoum’s streets. Demonstrators in Omdurman set fire to service stations and fight with soldiers.

Oct. 26—President Ibrahim Abboud announces that he has dissolved the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces and his cabinet.

Oct. 28—The Omdurman radio reports that President Abboud has imposed martial law and proclaimed a state of emergency; demonstrations and riots continue.

Oct. 30—A transition coalition government is formed. President Abboud remains as head-of-state; Sir-el-Khatim el-Khalifa will serve as Premier.

Oct. 31—Premier el-Khalifa and his cabinet are sworn in, ending 6 years of military rule.

SYRIA

Oct. 3—It is reported that Premier Salah el-Bitar has resigned.

Oct. 4—The Damascus radio broadcasts the news that el-Bitar’s cabinet has resigned. A new cabinet with Major General Amin el-Hafez as Premier is announced. El-Hafez is also head of the 5-man Presidency Council.

U.S.S.R., THE(See also *France*)

Oct. 6—The Soviet government, in a note to the British and U.S. embassies, charges that the 1 British and 3 American attachés detained in Khabarovsk last month were guilty of spying; they are accused of taking 900 photographs. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Oct. 12—The Soviet spaceship *Voskhod* (Sunrise), carrying 3 astronauts clad in street clothing, is orbited. The 3 men (the commander of the craft, a physician, and a scientist) are viewed over Soviet television; they converse with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev and President Anastas Mikoyan.

Oct. 13—The *Voskhod* lands safely in Kazakhstan near its launching site after completing 16 orbits around the earth in 24 hours, 17 minutes.

Oct. 16—*Tass* (Soviet press agency) reports that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., at meetings on October 14 and 15, decided to remove Khrushchev as Premier, as First Secretary of the Communist party, and as a member of the Presidium. *Tass* states that the action was taken at Khrushchev's request "in view of his advanced age and deterioration of health."

Khrushchev is replaced by Leonid I. Brezhnev as Party Secretary, and by Aleksei N. Kosygin as Premier. The whereabouts of Khrushchev is not known.

Oct. 17—*Pravda* (Soviet Communist newspaper) publishes an editorial stating that Brezhnev and Kosygin will continue a policy of peaceful coexistence.

Oct. 19—Brezhnev, Kosygin, President Mikoyan and other leaders appear at a Moscow celebration in honor of the 3 astronauts.

The Chief of Staff of the Soviet Army, Marshal Sergi Semyonovich Biryuzov, is killed in a plane crash near Belgrade, Yugoslavia.

Oct. 24—*Izvestia* (government newspaper) announces that grain collections have reached a record high.

Tass (official Soviet press agency) reports that within the last few days Brezhnev and Kosygin met with Polish leader Wladyslaw Gomulka along the Polish-Soviet frontier. (See also *Poland*.)

Oct. 26—In an editorial in *Izvestia* entitled "A Commonwealth of Equals," the Soviet government declares it will work to unify Communist countries and parties while recognizing their "equality and sovereignty."

Oct. 30—Non-Soviet Communist sources report that a 40-page written list citing 29 charges against Communist leader Khrushchev has been circulated among Soviet party cells and foreign Communist parties.

It is reported that Khrushchev has sent letters asking to be relieved of membership on the Central Committee of the Communist party and the Supreme Soviet (parliament).

UNITED STATES, THE**Agriculture**

Oct. 23—Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman announces that the food stamp program has been expanded to include 41 states and the District of Columbia.

Civil Rights(See *Segregation*)**Economy**

Oct. 15—The Labor Department reports that in September, 1964, the number of workers in non-agricultural jobs rose to 59.8 million.

Oct. 20—The Treasury reports that in the first quarter of fiscal 1965, the federal government spent \$41 million less than in the same quarter in fiscal 1964.

Foreign Policy

Oct. 1—The Defense Department confirms that the 2 destroyers involved in the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin on September 18 were the *Morton* and the *Richard S. Edwards*.

Oct. 5—Philippine President Diosdado Macapagal and his wife are received by President and Mrs. Johnson; Macapagal is on a 12-day state visit to the U.S.

A U.S. State Department spokesman, Robert J. McCloskey, declares that the U.S. has protested to the Soviet Union over an incident last month in which 3 U.S. military attachés and 1 British military attaché were detained, their hotel rooms searched, and their belongings confiscated. (See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Oct. 16—The Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., Anatoly F. Dobrynin, personally delivers assurances to President Johnson that the new Soviet leaders wish to continue present foreign policy based on peaceful co-existence.

Oct. 18—In an address to the people of the U.S., President Johnson discloses that the testing site of China's October 16 nuclear explosion was in Sinkiang Province.

Oct. 20—The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, following an analysis of the radioactive matter from the Chinese explosion, reports that in yield the bomb had an explosive force of 20 kilotons (similar to the Hiroshima bomb). The Chinese bomb was triggered by enriched uranium, an advanced procedure. The U.S. State Department reports that Communist China has sent a message to President Johnson urging a world disarmament conference.

Oct. 28—A U.S. statement submitted to the U.N. Special Committee on Colonialism is made public by the U.S. State Department. The U.S. supports British opposition to Rhodesia's threatened unilateral declaration of independence (See also *British Territories, Rhodesia.*)

Government

Oct. 2—*The Washington Evening Star* publishes excerpts from the testimony of J. Edgar Hoover, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Warren Commission; Hoover warned that "absolute security" for a president would involve "totalitarian security."

U.S. Attorney Joseph P. Hoey asks that the case against Aleksander Sokolov and his wife (known as Joy Ann Baltch), accused of spying for the U.S.S.R., be dismissed to avoid endangering "national security." The Sokolovs are then arrested by agents of the Immigration and Naturalization Service and will be held for deportation proceedings.

The Senate completes congressional action on a bill to expand the National Defense Education Act for 3 years from June 30, 1965, to June 30, 1968.

The House of Representatives approves a \$3.25 billion foreign aid appropriations bill passed earlier by the Senate; the bill goes to the White House without a proposed Senate rider to the effect that the "sense of Congress" is to delay state legislature reapportionment.

The Senate completes congressional action on the foreign aid authorization measure, setting ceilings on the amounts to be spent in the various aid categories.

Oct. 3—The Senate and House adjourn, terminating the 9-month second session of the 88th Congress.

President Johnson announces a White House fellowship program, supported by Carnegie Fund grants, under which 15 persons from business and professional fields will serve for 15 months in high-level posts. President Johnson approves the admission of employees of the U.S. Information Agency to full Foreign Service status.

Oct. 7—President Johnson signs the \$3.25 billion foreign aid appropriation bill, allocating \$1.05 billion for arms aid, \$773 million for development loans to poor countries, \$509 million for the Alliance for Progress, and \$401 million to build up the economies of countries bordering on the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Johnson signs a \$1.1 billion appropriations bill (passed by Congress just before it adjourned) for supplemental funds to finance measures enacted too late for regular appropriations, including \$861.5 million for the war on poverty program.

Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze, visiting the Brooklyn (N.Y.) Navy Yard, declares that the Yard is not "doomed." The Yard has been subject to layoffs.

Mr. and Mrs. Aleksander Sokolov, at an Immigration and Naturalization Service hearing, ask to be deported to Czechoslovakia.

Oct. 8—President Johnson signs a \$3.5 billion bill to continue the food for peace program another 2 years.

Oct. 11—A report by the House Intergovernmental Relations subcommittee clears President Johnson and federal officials of any illegal activities connected with the Billie Sol Estes grain scandal; the report proposes better coordination among federal agencies to prevent price manipulations.

Oct. 14—White House Press Secretary George Reedy announces that Walter W. Jenkins, a White House special assistant and personal aide to President Johnson, has resigned following disclosure of his arrest last week for disorderly conduct including "indecent gestures." News of a previous arrest on a morals charge is also revealed. Jenkins is hospitalized for "nervous exhaustion."

Oct. 15—President Johnson declares, in a personal statement, that he never received any information about Walter Jenkins' arrests.

Oct. 16—President Johnson signs the \$1.8 billion extension for the National Defense Education Act.

The White House discloses that President Johnson has signed a bill increasing benefits for veterans and their widows now receiving federal pensions.

Oct. 17—President Johnson signs a bill authorizing the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to determine the validity of claims, and amount to be paid, for U.S. citizens' property expropriated by the Cuban government. The measure is designed to facilitate eventual recovery of the property.

Oct. 18—In a nationwide radio and television broadcast, President Johnson informs listeners as to U.S. policy toward the new

government in the U.S.S.R. and toward Communist China, which has just tested its first nuclear device.

Oct. 20—Herbert Hoover, U.S. President from 1929 to 1933, dies at the age of 90.

Oct. 22—The Director of the F.B.I., J. Edgar Hoover, releases a summary of a report sent to the White House on the subject of possible Jenkins' involvement in any violation of national security. Jenkins had access to classified information. The report states that there is no evidence of any breach of security by Jenkins.

Oct. 23—The body of ex-President Herbert C. Hoover lies in state in the rotunda of the Capitol.

Oct. 28—*The New York Times* reports that "a qualified source" has indicated that President Johnson is opposed to an increase in steel prices.

Labor

Oct. 1—A federal judge signs an order for a temporary 10-day injunction to halt a strike by the International Longshoremen's Association. Shortly before this, the Justice Department, on orders from President Johnson, filed a motion for an injunction.

Oct. 2—The I.L.A. suspends its nationwide strike involving 60,000 longshoremen.

Oct. 5—Vice-President of General Motors Louis Seaton and United Automobile Workers Union President Walter Reuther announce that tentative agreement on a new 3-year contract has been reached. The tentative agreement is not to become effective or end the U.A.W. strike until the nearly 16,000 local issues at G.M. have been settled. It is reported that the new agreement will cost G.M. 60 cents an hour, and possibly 70 cents an hour.

Oct. 10—A federal judge issues a restraining order to continue the injunction against an I.L.A. strike; the 80-day cooling-off period, as provided for in the Taft-Hartley Act, will expire December 20.

Oct. 15—At the midnight deadline for a new labor contract, the U.A.W. strikes against the American Motors Corporation.

Oct. 20—A presidential emergency board, composed of 7 members, recommends that non-operating railroad workers receive a \$.27 hourly increase over a 3-year period. The board criticizes management and the 11 unions involved in the negotiations, and urges that “the parties reform their approach to the emergency board procedures. . . .”

Oct. 25—U.A.W. Vice-President Leonard Woodcock announces that a majority, voting at local meetings, has approved the national contract negotiated with General Motors. Auto workers will return to their jobs except at 28 G.M. plants where local issues have not yet been settled.

Military

Oct. 1—The Navy announces that it has located and photographed pieces of the *Thresher*, the atomic submarine that sank on April 10, 1963.

Oct. 8—The Military Operations subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee issues a report charging that Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara has permitted economic considerations to delay developing a military communications satellite system.

Oct. 9—The Defense Department issues a statement that a better satellite communications system at a lower cost will be developed.

Oct. 15—The F-111 (formerly known as the TFX), a twin jet fighter-bomber plane, is publicly shown.

Oct. 26—In a military training exercise on the Spanish southern coast, 9 U.S. marines are killed when 2 helicopters collide.

Politics

Oct. 3—President Johnson declares that the Republican charge that the Administration is soft on communism is “nonsense.” Republican presidential candidate, Senator Barry Goldwater, made the charge last week.

The New York Herald Tribune, in an editorial, announces its support of the Johnson-Humphrey ticket. For the first

time in its 124 years, the newspaper supports a Democratic presidential candidate.

Oct. 5—In a prepared statement, Goldwater states that if elected he would ask former President Dwight Eisenhower to go to South Vietnam.

Oct. 6—Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson travels through Virginia and North Carolina on the first of a 4-day whistlestop tour of the South.

Oct. 7—Visiting Des Moines, Iowa, President Johnson attracts crowds of over 175,000 persons.

Oct. 9—At a \$100-a-plate dinner in New Orleans, Louisiana, President Johnson urges an end to segregation; “posterity must know no Mason-Dixon Line. . . .”

Oct. 11—The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, delivers a sermon in Brooklyn, New York, urging all Negro voters to repudiate Goldwater.

Oct. 13—Goldwater, in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, terms the Democratic party a “fascist organization”; the remark is made in reference to the expulsion of a Milwaukee alderman from the Democratic party because he is supporting Goldwater.

Oct. 15—At a Liberal party rally in New York City’s Madison Square Garden, Johnson reaffirms his dedication to building a “Great Society.”

Oct. 18—Goldwater declares that “forced integration is just as wrong as forced segregation”; he opposes compulsory busing of school children to achieve integrated education.

Oct. 21—In a nationwide television speech, Goldwater addresses himself to the problems of the change in Soviet leadership and the Chinese nuclear explosion. He criticizes the Administration for not halting “the march of Communism. . . .”

Oct. 26—At Madison Square Garden, Barry Goldwater addresses 18,000 persons; he receives a 28-minute ovation. Charging Johnson with “political daddyism,” Goldwater promises to support neighborhood schools,

- Oct. 27—Campaigning in Ohio, Goldwater tells a Cleveland rally that the 1964 civil rights act is unfair because it infringes on "the rights of some in order to further the rights of others."
- Oct. 29—The Democratic vice-presidential candidate, Hubert Humphrey, addresses a Liberal party rally in New York City's garment industry section.
- Oct. 31—President Johnson winds up his 1964 election campaign at an overflow rally in New York City's Madison Square Garden.

Segregation and Civil Rights

- Oct. 3—The Federal Bureau of Investigation arrests 5 Mississippians (4 law enforcement officers in Philadelphia and a former sheriff); they are charged with depriving Negroes of their civil rights by unlawfully detaining and beating them. Yesterday a federal grand jury in Biloxi returned 2 indictments in an investigation of racial violence in Philadelphia and Neshoba, paving the way for the arrests.
- Oct. 4—In an open letter to President Johnson, 18 Democratic congressmen urge the federal government to take measures to end terrorism in Mississippi.
In Vicksburg, Mississippi, a Negro church, used for voter registration activities, is bombed.
- Oct. 6—The head of the Jackson Heights Parents and Taxpayers Association (P.A.T.) in New York City, the group's lawyer, 2 private teachers, and 65 first and second grade white children enter Public School 149, and occupy 2 classrooms. The youngsters are assigned to P.S. 92, which was paired with P.S. 149 to achieve racial balance. Previously the children attended a P.A.T. private school, rather than accept the transfer.
- Oct. 7—Some 65 parents are arrested for loitering on school premises at P.S. 149; the parents forced their way into the school.
- Oct. 8—At Public School 121 in Queens, some 100 white parents are dispersed by police when they attempt to storm the school.

Oct. 14—In Augusta, Georgia, a Negro is elected to the City Council, for the first time since Reconstruction.

The Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., of the U.S. receives the Nobel Peace Prize for 1964. King is head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and an active civil rights worker.

- Oct. 22—In Mississippi, a federal district judge holds U.S. Justice Department officials in contempt for failing to draw up perjury indictments requested by a grand jury. Judge Harold Cox holds U.S. Attorney Robert Hauberg in contempt; he also orders Acting Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to show why he should not be held in contempt. The action results from the federal government's refusal to bring perjury indictments against Negroes and against white civil rights workers, who are accused of having given false or inaccurate testimony with regard to registration procedures or civil rights violations. The Justice Department finds no evidence of perjury.
- Oct. 23—In Jackson, Mississippi, Circuit Judge W. H. Watkins suspends sentences against 9 white men accused of bombing 3 Negro homes in McComb, Miss.; they are placed on probation and fined \$500 apiece.
At John Jay High School, in Brooklyn, N.Y., white and Negro students battle in the streets.

Supreme Court

- Oct. 5—The Supreme Court opens a new term.
The Court hears arguments on the constitutionality of the public accommodations title of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
- Oct. 19—The Supreme Court refuses to review a decision by the N. Y. Court of Appeals upholding the New York City Board of Education's right to zone a new school to minimize racial imbalance.
- Oct. 26—The Supreme Court affirms a ruling by a 3-judge federal district court in Virginia that the state of Virginia may not keep separate voting, tax and property

records for whites and Negroes. The Court upholds the lower court ruling that a Virginia law requiring the race of both husband and wife to be listed on divorce decrees is constitutional.

Oct. 28—The Supreme Court refuses to hear arguments on Senator Goldwater's demand for television and radio time equal to that given President Johnson on October 18 to address the nation on world problems. The F.C.C. has ruled that the October 18 speech was "an act of office" and not subject to equal time regulations.

Chief Justice Earl Warren refuses to grant a stay of a lower court ruling ordering reapportionment of Virginia's state legislature. The reapportionment ruling would cut short the terms of state senators by 2 years; their terms would end prematurely on January 12, 1966.

VATICAN, THE

Oct. 5—In 4 votes today, the Ecumenical Council approves 4 sections of the schema "De Ecumenismo" ("Of Ecumenism or the Goal of Christian Unity") to promote greater Christian unity. The approved texts blame both Catholics and Protestants for past schisms, recognize salvation outside the Church, and urge Catholics to promote the ecumenical movement.

Oct. 16—It is announced that an instruction authorizing liturgical revision (the priest will henceforth face his congregation when he celebrates the mass) has been distributed to the Council's Fathers.

Oct. 18—Pope Paul VI proclaims 22 African martyrs to be saints. Pope Paul announces that he will attend the World Eucharistic Congress in India in December.

VENEZUELA

Oct. 13—The Venezuela cabinet resigns.

VIETNAM, SOUTH

Oct. 1—Lieutenant General Tran Thien Khiem, a member of the ruling triumvirate, does not leave the country today. His

intention to leave was announced yesterday.

Oct. 2—Premier Nguyen Khanh warns that government forces will be used to break up strikes or protests.

Oct. 4—Troops patrol Saigon because of a threatened labor strike.

In an encounter between Vietcong (pro-Communist) rebels and government forces, 23 soldiers are killed.

Oct. 7—Tran Thien Khiem departs on a goodwill mission abroad.

Oct. 20—The 17-member High National Council publishes a constitution to return South Vietnam to civilian rule. The charter, which is to replace the caretaker government of Premier Khanh, states that the transition to civilian rule will be gradual.

Oct. 23—A Military court acquits 20 generals, colonels and civilians charged with attempting to overthrow the government on September 13.

Oct. 24—The High National Council names Phan Khac Suu chief-of-state; he is a civilian.

Premier Nguyen Khanh gives acquitted military rebels light detention sentences as military discipline; they are given a week to leave the armed services.

Oct. 25—The U.S. Department of Defense announces that 8 U.S. Army and Air Force personnel were aboard a C-123 transport plane shot down in Vietnam yesterday; they are missing and believed dead. (See also *Cambodia*.)

Oct. 26—Phan Khac Suu is sworn in. He accepts Premier Khanh's resignation and that of Major General Duong Van Minh, who has acted as chief-of-state.

Oct. 31—The U.S. Department of Defense announces that Vietcong rebels have staged an attack within mortar range of the U.S. Air Force base at Bienhoa. Six U.S. B-57's, 1 U.S. helicopter, and 2 Vietnamese planes are destroyed in the fighting; 8 other B-57's are damaged. Four Americans are killed.

Premier Tran Van Huong promises to wage "total war" against Communists. The High National Council confirms his appointment as Premier.

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